Knowledge From the Afrikan World, For the World

PMC Articles

Rethinking marine plastics pollution: Science diplomacy and multi-level governance

PMCID: PMC10933700

PMID: 38481579

Abstract

Although science diplomacy has been gaining relevance in foreign policy to solve environmental challenges, critical questions concerning what different instruments mean under the term ‘science diplomacy’ and whether science diplomacy does contribute to the progress in solving environmental issues remain unanswered. We explore those questions by linking science diplomacy salient features through documentary analysis of international instruments addressing the plastics pollution in the ocean. We find that from a science diplomacy and multi-level governance perspective, the responsibilities and capabilities of emergent actors of cross-level governance are also important, leading to more attention being paid to changes in the role of national authorities, away from passive leadership to cross-cutting coalitions supported by the salient features of science diplomacy, and redefining dominant discursive approaches that have framed plastics waste. Points for practitioners As a result of the cost and limitations of the current international mechanisms, there is currently no incentive for individual countries to take action against marine plastic pollution. Science diplomacy and multi-level governance can contribute to international cooperation, foreign policy and national strategies. Leading efforts to engage countries with fewer scientific and technological capabilities could benefit countries’ foreign policy.

Full Text

Science diplomacy (SD) has gained a foothold in foreign policy to solve global environmental issues. Indeed, SD has been envisioned as one of the policies for the European Commission to collectively address huge challenges such as environmental degradation (Moedas, 2016). The case study of substances depleting the ozone layer has been exemplified as a successful case that interlinks science and diplomacy. Science was used as a source of early warning for the depletion of the ozone layer, a force for change, a confidence-building activity, a measure of regulatory performance and a tool for diplomacy, specifically under the 1987 Montreal Protocol (Sarma and Andersen, 2011). However, the complex problem caused by plastics pollution in the ocean –impacting livelihoods, health, climate change, socio-economy and geopolitics – is one of the main unresolved global environmental issues. The lessons learned in the Montreal Protocol could be transferred to solve plastics pollution. Yet, so far, it has not been sufficiently clarified what different international instruments mean under the term science diplomacy in solving the issue of plastics pollution in the ocean.
The existing international, regional and national initiatives and policies have not produced the expected results (Agamuthu et al., 2019). There are multiple regulatory gaps and problems in international ocean plastics governance (Chen, 2015; Gold et al., 2014), including the lack of harmonisation of international laws, weak coherence across national policies, weak coordination of international organisations and inadequate science–policy interaction (Ferraro and Failler, 2020). Analyses of governance emphasise the importance of concurrent instruments at the different levels of governance (Chen, 2015; Gold et al., 2014), supra-national, international and national, to combat plastics pollution in the ocean. However, this poses significant challenges for policymakers, meaning the long-term response, the potential incoherence within and between policy goals and policy means, and the governance ability (Rayner and Howlett, 2009).
The urgency and relevance of global challenges have triggered an increased demand for international cooperation in science, technology and innovation (Boekholt et al., 2009). The continuing global challenges and the role of science in solving them have continued to demand the integration of international science cooperation (Turekian, 2018). Science as a broad basis for diplomacy has significantly increased in relevance to dealing with environmental problems.
Broadly speaking, literature on SD linked to marine environmental issues can be grouped into articles dealing with marine biodiversity, conservation and protected areas (Harden-Davies, 2018; Kleinhaus et al., 2020; Teff-Seker et al., 2020), management of the polar regions, Atlantic ocean (Pan and Huntington, 2016; Polejack et al., 2021) and international instruments (Paglia, 2021; Polejack, 2021). In the literature review, only a few articles were found in which marine-related international instruments had been explicitly mentioned in connection to SD.
Polejack (2021) discussed the importance of SD to reconcile different positions driven by the gap between scientific capacities and access to research infrastructure between developed and developing countries at the negotiations in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, states were organised into clusters (e.g. the G77 plus China, the landlocked states, etc.), and trade-offs among states led to the agreement of compromises in the Convention. Yet, the author noted, research capacity and technology transfer have yet to reach a desirable level. In order to overcome historical obstacles (such as the scientific capacity gap) and progress long-awaited initiatives, such as mapping and forecasting the ocean, SD will be pivotal. Paglia (2021) acknowledges that environmental diplomacy was closely allied with science at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE). In terms of science in diplomacy, a Swedish scientist-diplomat facilitated the development of a scientific understanding of widespread environmental degradation's societal threat to inform foreign policy, while diplomacy for science emphasised the importance of mobilising knowledge and experience for developing countries through appropriate international cooperation.
SD has its roots in the realms of security (Turekian, 2018). After the conflict between the United States and Iraq and the 9/11 tragic events (Lord and Turekian, 2007), the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) increased its focus on SD to improve its weakened foreign policy and diplomacy engagement with the Middle East and North Africa region (Turekian, 2018). In 2010 the AASS, along with the British Royal Society, defined SD as a concept in three ways: (a) science in diplomacy; (b) diplomacy for science; (c) science for diplomacy (Royal Society, 2010) (Table 1). Applying these three ways to conceptualise SD is grounded on the understanding that science and politics are the dominant elements. However, SD should be distinguished from its scientific and political context.
Science diplomacy definitions by the Royal Society (2010).
The definitions by the Royal Society have been evolving to include different features and views of SD. For instance, Fähnrich (2017) pointed out that at first glance, science for diplomacy and diplomacy for science may be seen as two sides of the same coin; however, when he examined the views of scholars from a German SD programme, not all of them are willing to follow the government views. Besides, other authors call for an extended dimension of science for diplomacy that seeks to reflect the political influence sought and exerted under the term SD in which countries in the international arena represent their interests with a base of knowledge acquired by the scientific method (Gluckman et al., 2017; Ruffini, 2020; Turekian, 2018).
Overall, all these SD dimensions represent ways in which states, or relevant actors, use scientific knowledge to help build international partnerships to address common problems (Patman and Davis, 2017), driven by a subset of public diplomacy (Copeland, 2015). However, the interaction between science, technology and international affairs is embedded in a complex combination of political, legal and cultural forces (Weiss, 2015). Our methodology was first set to apply the different mainstream definitions of SD to marine plastics governance documents. However, we examined the main salient features of SD dimensions to establish a common understanding, while acknowledging the evolving definitions of SD. SD is a broad and evolving concept representing a wide range of meanings insufficiently captured by the Royal Society dimensions. This paper does not intend to produce a new definition; rather, it intends to address what different instruments mean under the term SD.
At this point, we added extended dimensions’ features that emerged from definitions that recall the political influence sought and exerted under the term science diplomacy, in which countries in the international arena represent their own interests with a base of knowledge acquired by the scientific method (Gluckman et al., 2017; Ruffini, 2020; Turekian, 2018). We labelled the new salient feature under the science for diplomacy dimension (see Figure 1). As a starting point, the framework for analysis distinguishes the salient features of the Royal Society definitions for science for diplomacy, science in diplomacy and diplomacy for science. The features that describe the functions of scientists include: ‘scientific cooperation’, providing ‘scientific advice’ and advances in ‘scientific research’, while the features that describe the functions of diplomats can be summarised as improvement of ‘international relationships’, informing ‘foreign policy’ and use of ‘political capital’. However, those features fail to capture the use of SD to represent a country's interest using scientific knowledge (see for example descriptions from Gluckman et al., 2017; Ruffini, 2020; Turekian, 2018). In order to represent this salient feature, the dimension of SD was chosen as an umbrella. The new feature was labelled as prioritising ‘national needs’ (see Figure 1).
To answer the research questions, this study tested the analytical framework in the context of international instruments related to managing marine plastic pollution issues driven by organisations that operate at the supra-level, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its role as facilitator for prevention and control of marine pollution from ships (IMO, 2019a) and the United Nations (UN) agency in environmental affairs – the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP, 2023).
A documentary research review and analysis (Ahmed, 2010; Tight, 2019) was employed to explore the role of the international institutions in tackling marine plastic pollution. This methodological approach is recommended when data may not be available in other forms, organisations are required to publish normative documents, documents are reliable data sources for comparative policy, ethical issues are not an immediate issue (e.g. privacy issues), documents are prepared before the research, and thus are ‘non-reactive’, documents may provide supplementary data that can be used to contextualise or clarify other methods of data collection, and documentary analysis may also help to inform different stages of the research process (Shaw et al., 2004). Although documents are not necessarily a neutral source and may represent a partial account of the problem (Atkinson and Coffey, 2010), and the analysis ‘may also tend to be positivist in philosophy, taking at face value the “apparent” meanings of texts’ (Shaw et al., 2004: 259). Yet this methodology still has value to represent the statements of policies and strategies at particular points in time through an interpretative analysis.
Secondly, a refinement of the selection of publications (12) was accomplished, considering the following eligibility criteria on – the document is important to understand the role of international instruments in addressing plastic marine pollution. Documents were selected and grouped according to their relation to the main marine legislation (nine). The latest versions of the documents and related treaties were sought (i.e. London Convention (LC)/London Protocol (LP) (two), International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (two), UNCLOS (two), Basel Convention (one)). Thirdly, these documents (seven) were revised along the main international organisation web pages (e.g. IMO.org, Basel.int, etc.) (see Annex 2). The interpretation and summary of the potential impact on combating marine plastics pollution of these instruments was made in Excel by two researchers independently (see Annex 3 and Table 2):

Fourthly, SD features (Figure 1) contained in each instrument were analysed, interpreted and represented in Table 3 (see Annex 3).
Comparing the international instruments revealed similarities and differences. The similarities lie in the emphasis on the prevention and control of marine pollution as one of the key objectives of these instruments. Yet there are differences in the types of sources and the plastic materials/items covered by the regulations. As shown in Table 2, instruments cover plastic ‘waste’ or ‘garbage’ that is discarded from ships (direct disposal, ship-borne operations) (LC/LP, MARPOL) as well as plastic wastes that are subject to transboundary movements (Basel Convention), but plastics are not specifically addressed in UNCLOS. Moreover, a common point is the difficulty of complying with the instruments (e.g. garbage amounts vary by ship category, legal ambiguity persists to define hazardous or non-hazardous plastic waste, etc.). Overall, these instruments play complementary roles in preventing and controlling marine pollution, but with fragmented authority.
It is evident from Table 3 that the revised documents have used SD features to connect the best expertise (scientific cooperation and advice) of international organisations and the advanced states in plastics pollution management with developing countries and inform the foreign policy – all instruments promote scientific research and technical collaboration to address the pollution of the marine environment. International organisations such as the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP), using scientific cooperation, are best situated to provide scientific advice to inform environmental policy. The scientific communities have developed guidelines and methodologies for analysing marine macro- and micro-plastics, conducting research and providing relevant policy recommendations for member countries. Besides, support and utilisation of scientific research through international instruments are expected to indirectly advance science.
In seeking to understand whether international governance from supra-national level has contributed to the progress of solving marine pollution, many have pointed out that strengthening international mechanisms is holding the key to progressing the solving of marine plastics pollution at international levels, focusing on the improvement of the obligatory character of international mechanisms (Vince and Hardesty, 2018), and development of a harmonious policy framework and coordinated policies (Dauvergne, 2018; Hugo, 2018; Pinto da Costa et al., 2020; Raubenheimer and McIlgorm, 2017). However, it remains unclear who fills the gaps in the instruments at a time when certain international cooperation, coordination and compliance mechanisms are absent due to fragmented authority and ambiguous coverage of plastic waste types and sources.
From an SD perspective, marine plastics pollution instruments have also been shaped by forms of governance that stretch across tiers supported by features of SD. This is not to deny the importance of strengthening international mechanisms. It is, however, to provide insights into the key factors encountered that prevent progress and that, under SD, could be redefined to take a more important role: the passive role of national authorities and representatives relying on the long-term development of a legal framework from supra-national and inter-regional levels rather than an active leadership. SD features such as scientific cooperation, advice and research supported by international relationship, foreign policy and political capital, have advanced international agreements. However, the power balance and political opportunity are crucial parts of the difficulties faced by international coordination (Ferraro and Failler, 2020). It often involves complex policies and goals, and only high-level stakeholders are involved – it can neither be assumed to exist nor solely relied upon (Rüffin, 2020). The prioritisation of national needs evidenced in the lack of commitment of country members to ratify the conventions, and difficulty in compliance and control of the sources of plastics pollution, act as a barrier for strengthening those international mechanisms. For example, LC adopted the control and prevention of marine pollution, but fewer parties than expected were able to contribute, and the growth of participants in ratifying the Convention was slower than anticipated (Harrison, 2017).
The opportunity here for leader nations is to revaluate their national needs in light of the potential benefits that could accrue from leading advancements in solving the problem of marine pollution including the enhancement of international relationships and national foreign policies – features embedded in SD. This leadership could benefit both country nations and marine plastics governance. However, cross-cutting leadership, supported by international agencies, needs to be also able to drive a multi-level regulatory framework for plastics (political capital) because the broad coverage of plastics-related issues under different levels of marine governance results in a lack of focus and priority with regard to plastics pollution and substantial hurdles in assessing the international and national instruments today. Initiatives from Japan (Dickella Gamaralalage and Onogawa, 2019) and Norway (IMO, 2019b) to assist developing countries in identifying opportunities to prevent and reduce marine litter and decrease the use of plastics in industries, which integrate various features of SD (e.g. scientific advice, scientific cooperation, political capital, etc.), could help to re-imagine the powers and capabilities of nations’ actors to develop leadership across multiple tiers.
In spite of all the efforts so far, the review in Table 2 showed that there is no single treaty instrument or policy framework to deal specifically with plastics marine litter within the current global governance. For instance, UNCLOS has many gaps regarding environmental protection (Bateman, 2007) and lacks specific standards for plastics pollution from both the sea and land-based sources. Besides, a multi-level regulation for plastics pollution is imperative, considering the growing consequences of marine debris pollution on humans and the environment (Ringbom and Henriksen, 2017), with a level of commitment equal to the global magnitude of the problem (Borrelle et al., 2017).
Moreover, this cross-cutting leadership supported by international agencies should also drive resources to increase treatment capabilities in the global south to absorb the growing waste generation. Although most of the international instruments promote scientific and technical cooperation, funding and other forms of partnership with the developed states are highly required (Sarma and Andersen, 2011); it is estimated that countries in Southeast Asia could only manage the disposal and burning of 25%–75% of the imported plastics waste (Law et al., 2020). International bureaucracies may have a wider role in international climate negotiations by interacting with sub-national and non-state actors (Hickmann et al., 2021). The critical issues of waste management are faced not only by the developing world but also by the most industrialised nations that lack waste management treatment capabilities (D’Amato et al., 2019). However, in the long term, the sole improvement of treatment capabilities of waste management does not appear to provide a solution by itself; the recycling system only perpetuates the problem, driving more plastics production.
Focusing solely on the recycling system leads to a discussion about the discursive approach framing plastics in the international agreements as ‘waste’ or ‘garbage’ – fostering economic growth. The need to achieve higher economic growth (Everett et al., 2010) has shaped the debate about marine plastics, in which policies related to environmental management are often sidelined. Placing the plastics pollution issue as a national priority is challenged by mainly economic considerations (Barrowclough and Deere Birkbeck, 2020), ‘trapping’ countries in the middle of a trade-off between attaining economic development and preserving the environment. Especially as ‘extensive structural change in the economic system is required to achieve sustainable use of natural resources; it is not possible to “develop to sustainability”’ (Cumming and Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2018: 9533). For instance, this interpretation of the plastics marine problem based on economic growth has shaped the continued waste exchange from the global north to the south, the (lack of) recycling systems, and the prioritisation of corporate self-regulation. In this context, although marine plastics pollution continues to be framed under economic discourses, it will perpetuate the problem.
This paper contributes novel insights into SD literature by specifying the main salient features that can be used either individually or collectively to characterise ‘science’ and ‘diplomacy’ functions. In this context, the SD features can shed light on the opportunities and limitations facing transboundary environmental problems, particularly identifying forms of governance that are supported by SD features that can potentially emerge to be more relevant. As a newly emerging area, however, SD does not have clearly delineated legal jurisdictions. Recent attempts from Rüffin (2020), based on the theoretical notions of MLG from Marks and Hooghe (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Marks and Hooghe, 2004), conceptualise SD as a Type II MLG system in which ‘Policies concerning SD might touch upon innumerable jurisdictions’ (Rüffin, 2020: 3).
In advancing environmental governance, the case of plastics pollution in the ocean based on a documentary review and analysis draws attention to the link between SD salient features and international policies for marine plastics pollution. Although this methodology has its merits to accomplish the review and the analysis, it may be biased in representing a complete account of the problem. Further studies with empirical data from interviews with the main international stakeholders should investigate the subsequent question of whether the SD perspective and its application in Type II MLG are feasible, and its implications, taking into account the countries dependency on plastic production and consumption. At the same time, it would be worthwhile reviewing its implications for alternative plastic materials such as bioplastics and their supply chains issues described by Beltran et al. (2021) and Liliani et al. (2020), and comparing similar studies for transboundary problems. For instance, the battles between science and policy played out in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate change agenda.

Sections

"[{\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr38-00208523231183909\", \"bibr51-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Introduction\", \"text\": \"Science diplomacy (SD) has gained a foothold in foreign policy to solve global environmental issues. Indeed, SD has been envisioned as one of the policies for the European Commission to collectively address huge challenges such as environmental degradation (Moedas, 2016). The case study of substances depleting the ozone layer has been exemplified as a successful case that interlinks science and diplomacy. Science was used as a source of early warning for the depletion of the ozone layer, a force for change, a confidence-building activity, a measure of regulatory performance and a tool for diplomacy, specifically under the 1987 Montreal Protocol (Sarma and Andersen, 2011). However, the complex problem caused by plastics pollution in the ocean \\u2013impacting livelihoods, health, climate change, socio-economy and geopolitics \\u2013 is one of the main unresolved global environmental issues. The lessons learned in the Montreal Protocol could be transferred to solve plastics pollution. Yet, so far, it has not been sufficiently clarified what different international instruments mean under the term science diplomacy in solving the issue of plastics pollution in the ocean.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr1-00208523231183909\", \"bibr11-00208523231183909\", \"bibr21-00208523231183909\", \"bibr19-00208523231183909\", \"bibr11-00208523231183909\", \"bibr21-00208523231183909\", \"bibr46-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Introduction\", \"text\": \"The existing international, regional and national initiatives and policies have not produced the expected results (Agamuthu et al., 2019). There are multiple regulatory gaps and problems in international ocean plastics governance (Chen, 2015; Gold et al., 2014), including the lack of harmonisation of international laws, weak coherence across national policies, weak coordination of international organisations and inadequate science\\u2013policy interaction (Ferraro and Failler, 2020). Analyses of governance emphasise the importance of concurrent instruments at the different levels of governance (Chen, 2015; Gold et al., 2014), supra-national, international and national, to combat plastics pollution in the ocean. However, this poses significant challenges for policymakers, meaning the long-term response, the potential incoherence within and between policy goals and policy means, and the governance ability (Rayner and Howlett, 2009).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr9-00208523231183909\", \"bibr55-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Literature review on SD on international instruments on marine governance\", \"text\": \"The urgency and relevance of global challenges have triggered an increased demand for international cooperation in science, technology and innovation (Boekholt et al., 2009). The continuing global challenges and the role of science in solving them have continued to demand the integration of international science cooperation (Turekian, 2018). Science as a broad basis for diplomacy has significantly increased in relevance to dealing with environmental problems.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr22-00208523231183909\", \"bibr33-00208523231183909\", \"bibr53-00208523231183909\", \"bibr40-00208523231183909\", \"bibr44-00208523231183909\", \"bibr39-00208523231183909\", \"bibr43-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Literature review on SD on international instruments on marine governance\", \"text\": \"Broadly speaking, literature on SD linked to marine environmental issues can be grouped into articles dealing with marine biodiversity, conservation and protected areas (Harden-Davies, 2018; Kleinhaus et al., 2020; Teff-Seker et al., 2020), management of the polar regions, Atlantic ocean (Pan and Huntington, 2016; Polejack et al., 2021) and international instruments (Paglia, 2021; Polejack, 2021). In the literature review, only a few articles were found in which marine-related international instruments had been explicitly mentioned in connection to SD.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr43-00208523231183909\", \"bibr39-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Literature review on SD on international instruments on marine governance\", \"text\": \"Polejack (2021) discussed the importance of SD to reconcile different positions driven by the gap between scientific capacities and access to research infrastructure between developed and developing countries at the negotiations in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, states were organised into clusters (e.g. the G77 plus China, the landlocked states, etc.), and trade-offs among states led to the agreement of compromises in the Convention. Yet, the author noted, research capacity and technology transfer have yet to reach a desirable level. In order to overcome historical obstacles (such as the scientific capacity gap) and progress long-awaited initiatives, such as mapping and forecasting the ocean, SD will be pivotal. Paglia (2021) acknowledges that environmental diplomacy was closely allied with science at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE). In terms of science in diplomacy, a Swedish scientist-diplomat facilitated the development of a scientific understanding of widespread environmental degradation's societal threat to inform foreign policy, while diplomacy for science emphasised the importance of mobilising knowledge and experience for developing countries through appropriate international cooperation.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr55-00208523231183909\", \"bibr36-00208523231183909\", \"bibr55-00208523231183909\", \"bibr48-00208523231183909\", \"table1-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Analytical framework: conceptualising the link between SD salient features and marine plastics pollution\", \"text\": \"SD has its roots in the realms of security (Turekian, 2018). After the conflict between the United States and Iraq and the 9/11 tragic events (Lord and Turekian, 2007), the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) increased its focus on SD to improve its weakened foreign policy and diplomacy engagement with the Middle East and North Africa region (Turekian, 2018). In 2010 the AASS, along with the British Royal Society, defined SD as a concept in three ways: (a) science in diplomacy; (b) diplomacy for science; (c) science for diplomacy (Royal Society, 2010) (Table\\u00a01). Applying these three ways to conceptualise SD is grounded on the understanding that science and politics are the dominant elements. However, SD should be distinguished from its scientific and political context.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr48-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"Science diplomacy definitions by the Royal Society (2010).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr18-00208523231183909\", \"bibr20-00208523231183909\", \"bibr50-00208523231183909\", \"bibr55-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Analytical framework: conceptualising the link between SD salient features and marine plastics pollution\", \"text\": \"The definitions by the Royal Society have been evolving to include different features and views of SD. For instance, F\\u00e4hnrich (2017) pointed out that at first glance, science for diplomacy and diplomacy for science may be seen as two sides of the same coin; however, when he examined the views of scholars from a German SD programme, not all of them are willing to follow the government views. Besides, other authors call for an extended dimension of science for diplomacy that seeks to reflect the political influence sought and exerted under the term SD in which countries in the international arena represent their interests with a base of knowledge acquired by the scientific method (Gluckman et al., 2017; Ruffini, 2020; Turekian, 2018).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr41-00208523231183909\", \"bibr12-00208523231183909\", \"bibr62-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Analytical framework: conceptualising the link between SD salient features and marine plastics pollution\", \"text\": \"Overall, all these SD dimensions represent ways in which states, or relevant actors, use scientific knowledge to help build international partnerships to address common problems (Patman and Davis, 2017), driven by a subset of public diplomacy (Copeland, 2015). However, the interaction between science, technology and international affairs is embedded in a complex combination of political, legal and cultural forces (Weiss, 2015). Our methodology was first set to apply the different mainstream definitions of SD to marine plastics governance documents. However, we examined the main salient features of SD dimensions to establish a common understanding, while acknowledging the evolving definitions of SD. SD is a broad and evolving concept representing a wide range of meanings insufficiently captured by the Royal Society dimensions. This paper does not intend to produce a new definition; rather, it intends to address what different instruments mean under the term SD.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr20-00208523231183909\", \"bibr50-00208523231183909\", \"bibr55-00208523231183909\", \"fig1-00208523231183909\", \"bibr20-00208523231183909\", \"bibr50-00208523231183909\", \"bibr55-00208523231183909\", \"fig1-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Analytical framework: conceptualising the link between SD salient features and marine plastics pollution\", \"text\": \"At this point, we added extended dimensions\\u2019 features that emerged from definitions that recall the political influence sought and exerted under the term science diplomacy, in which countries in the international arena represent their own interests with a base of knowledge acquired by the scientific method (Gluckman et al., 2017; Ruffini, 2020; Turekian, 2018). We labelled the new salient feature under the science for diplomacy dimension (see Figure\\u00a01). As a starting point, the framework for analysis distinguishes the salient features of the Royal Society definitions for science for diplomacy, science in diplomacy and diplomacy for science. The features that describe the functions of scientists include: \\u2018scientific cooperation\\u2019, providing \\u2018scientific advice\\u2019 and advances in \\u2018scientific research\\u2019, while the features that describe the functions of diplomats can be summarised as improvement of \\u2018international relationships\\u2019, informing \\u2018foreign policy\\u2019 and use of \\u2018political capital\\u2019. However, those features fail to capture the use of SD to represent a country's interest using scientific knowledge (see for example descriptions from Gluckman et al., 2017; Ruffini, 2020; Turekian, 2018). In order to represent this salient feature, the dimension of SD was chosen as an umbrella. The new feature was labelled as prioritising \\u2018national needs\\u2019 (see Figure\\u00a01).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr29-00208523231183909\", \"bibr59-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Research approach\", \"text\": \"To answer the research questions, this study tested the analytical framework in the context of international instruments related to managing marine plastic pollution issues driven by organisations that operate at the supra-level, such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its role as facilitator for prevention and control of marine pollution from ships (IMO, 2019a) and the United Nations (UN) agency in environmental affairs \\u2013 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UNEP, 2023).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr2-00208523231183909\", \"bibr54-00208523231183909\", \"bibr52-00208523231183909\", \"bibr3-00208523231183909\", \"bibr52-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Research approach\", \"text\": \"A documentary research review and analysis (Ahmed, 2010; Tight, 2019) was employed to explore the role of the international institutions in tackling marine plastic pollution. This methodological approach is recommended when data may not be available in other forms, organisations are required to publish normative documents, documents are reliable data sources for comparative policy, ethical issues are not an immediate issue (e.g. privacy issues), documents are prepared before the research, and thus are \\u2018non-reactive\\u2019, documents may provide supplementary data that can be used to contextualise or clarify other methods of data collection, and documentary analysis may also help to inform different stages of the research process (Shaw et al., 2004). Although documents are not necessarily a neutral source and may represent a partial account of the problem (Atkinson and Coffey, 2010), and the analysis \\u2018may also tend to be positivist in philosophy, taking at face value the \\u201capparent\\u201d meanings of texts\\u2019 (Shaw et al., 2004: 259). Yet this methodology still has value to represent the statements of policies and strategies at particular points in time through an interpretative analysis.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"table2-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Research approach\", \"text\": \"Secondly, a refinement of the selection of publications (12) was accomplished, considering the following eligibility criteria on \\u2013 the document is important to understand the role of international instruments in addressing plastic marine pollution. Documents were selected and grouped according to their relation to the main marine legislation (nine). The latest versions of the documents and related treaties were sought (i.e. London Convention (LC)/London Protocol (LP) (two), International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (two), UNCLOS (two), Basel Convention (one)). Thirdly, these documents (seven) were revised along the main international organisation web pages (e.g. IMO.org, Basel.int, etc.) (see Annex 2). The interpretation and summary of the potential impact on combating marine plastics pollution of these instruments was made in Excel by two researchers independently (see Annex 3 and Table\\u00a02):\\n\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig1-00208523231183909\", \"table3-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Research approach\", \"text\": \"Fourthly, SD features (Figure\\u00a01) contained in each instrument were analysed, interpreted and represented in Table\\u00a03 (see Annex 3).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"table2-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Findings\", \"text\": \"Comparing the international instruments revealed similarities and differences. The similarities lie in the emphasis on the prevention and control of marine pollution as one of the key objectives of these instruments. Yet there are differences in the types of sources and the plastic materials/items covered by the regulations. As shown in Table\\u00a02, instruments cover plastic \\u2018waste\\u2019 or \\u2018garbage\\u2019 that is discarded from ships (direct disposal, ship-borne operations) (LC/LP, MARPOL) as well as plastic wastes that are subject to transboundary movements (Basel Convention), but plastics are not specifically addressed in UNCLOS. Moreover, a common point is the difficulty of complying with the instruments (e.g. garbage amounts vary by ship category, legal ambiguity persists to define hazardous or non-hazardous plastic waste, etc.). Overall, these instruments play complementary roles in preventing and controlling marine pollution, but with fragmented authority.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"table3-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Findings\", \"text\": \"It is evident from Table\\u00a03 that the revised documents have used SD features to connect the best expertise (scientific cooperation and advice) of international organisations and the advanced states in plastics pollution management with developing countries and inform the foreign policy \\u2013 all instruments promote scientific research and technical collaboration to address the pollution of the marine environment. International organisations such as the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection (GESAMP), using scientific cooperation, are best situated to provide scientific advice to inform environmental policy. The scientific communities have developed guidelines and methodologies for analysing marine macro- and micro-plastics, conducting research and providing relevant policy recommendations for member countries. Besides, support and utilisation of scientific research through international instruments are expected to indirectly advance science.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr61-00208523231183909\", \"bibr15-00208523231183909\", \"bibr26-00208523231183909\", \"bibr42-00208523231183909\", \"bibr45-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Discussion\", \"text\": \"In seeking to understand whether international governance from supra-national level has contributed to the progress of solving marine pollution, many have pointed out that strengthening international mechanisms is holding the key to progressing the solving of marine plastics pollution at international levels, focusing on the improvement of the obligatory character of international mechanisms (Vince and Hardesty, 2018), and development of a harmonious policy framework and coordinated policies (Dauvergne, 2018; Hugo, 2018; Pinto da Costa et al., 2020; Raubenheimer and McIlgorm, 2017). However, it remains unclear who fills the gaps in the instruments at a time when certain international cooperation, coordination and compliance mechanisms are absent due to fragmented authority and ambiguous coverage of plastic waste types and sources.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr19-00208523231183909\", \"bibr49-00208523231183909\", \"bibr23-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Discussion\", \"text\": \"From an SD perspective, marine plastics pollution instruments have also been shaped by forms of governance that stretch across tiers supported by features of SD. This is not to deny the importance of strengthening international mechanisms. It is, however, to provide insights into the key factors encountered that prevent progress and that, under SD, could be redefined to take a more important role: the passive role of national authorities and representatives relying on the long-term development of a legal framework from supra-national and inter-regional levels rather than an active leadership. SD features such as scientific cooperation, advice and research supported by international relationship, foreign policy and political capital, have advanced international agreements. However, the power balance and political opportunity are crucial parts of the difficulties faced by international coordination (Ferraro and Failler, 2020). It often involves complex policies and goals, and only high-level stakeholders are involved \\u2013 it can neither be assumed to exist nor solely relied upon (R\\u00fcffin, 2020). The prioritisation of national needs evidenced in the lack of commitment of country members to ratify the conventions, and difficulty in compliance and control of the sources of plastics pollution, act as a barrier for strengthening those international mechanisms. For example, LC adopted the control and prevention of marine pollution, but fewer parties than expected were able to contribute, and the growth of participants in ratifying the Convention was slower than anticipated (Harrison, 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr16-00208523231183909\", \"bibr30-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Discussion\", \"text\": \"The opportunity here for leader nations is to revaluate their national needs in light of the potential benefits that could accrue from leading advancements in solving the problem of marine pollution including the enhancement of international relationships and national foreign policies \\u2013 features embedded in SD. This leadership could benefit both country nations and marine plastics governance. However, cross-cutting leadership, supported by international agencies, needs to be also able to drive a multi-level regulatory framework for plastics (political capital) because the broad coverage of plastics-related issues under different levels of marine governance results in a lack of focus and priority with regard to plastics pollution and substantial hurdles in assessing the international and national instruments today. Initiatives from Japan (Dickella Gamaralalage and Onogawa, 2019) and Norway (IMO, 2019b) to assist developing countries in identifying opportunities to prevent and reduce marine litter and decrease the use of plastics in industries, which integrate various features of SD (e.g. scientific advice, scientific cooperation, political capital, etc.), could help to re-imagine the powers and capabilities of nations\\u2019 actors to develop leadership across multiple tiers.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"table2-00208523231183909\", \"bibr800-00208523231183909\", \"bibr47-00208523231183909\", \"bibr10-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Discussion\", \"text\": \"In spite of all the efforts so far, the review in Table\\u00a02 showed that there is no single treaty instrument or policy framework to deal specifically with plastics marine litter within the current global governance. For instance, UNCLOS has many gaps regarding environmental protection (Bateman, 2007) and lacks specific standards for plastics pollution from both the sea and land-based sources. Besides, a multi-level regulation for plastics pollution is imperative, considering the growing consequences of marine debris pollution on humans and the environment (Ringbom and Henriksen, 2017), with a level of commitment equal to the global magnitude of the problem (Borrelle et al., 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr51-00208523231183909\", \"bibr34-00208523231183909\", \"bibr24-00208523231183909\", \"bibr14-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Discussion\", \"text\": \"Moreover, this cross-cutting leadership supported by international agencies should also drive resources to increase treatment capabilities in the global south to absorb the growing waste generation. Although most of the international instruments promote scientific and technical cooperation, funding and other forms of partnership with the developed states are highly required (Sarma and Andersen, 2011); it is estimated that countries in Southeast Asia could only manage the disposal and burning of 25%\\u201375% of the imported plastics waste (Law et al., 2020). International bureaucracies may have a wider role in international climate negotiations by interacting with sub-national and non-state actors (Hickmann et al., 2021). The critical issues of waste management are faced not only by the developing world but also by the most industrialised nations that lack waste management treatment capabilities (D\\u2019Amato et al., 2019). However, in the long term, the sole improvement of treatment capabilities of waste management does not appear to provide a solution by itself; the recycling system only perpetuates the problem, driving more plastics production.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr17-00208523231183909\", \"bibr4-00208523231183909\", \"bibr13-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Discussion\", \"text\": \"Focusing solely on the recycling system leads to a discussion about the discursive approach framing plastics in the international agreements as \\u2018waste\\u2019 or \\u2018garbage\\u2019 \\u2013 fostering economic growth. The need to achieve higher economic growth (Everett et al., 2010) has shaped the debate about marine plastics, in which policies related to environmental management are often sidelined. Placing the plastics pollution issue as a national priority is challenged by mainly economic considerations (Barrowclough and Deere Birkbeck, 2020), \\u2018trapping\\u2019 countries in the middle of a trade-off between attaining economic development and preserving the environment. Especially as \\u2018extensive structural change in the economic system is required to achieve sustainable use of natural resources; it is not possible to \\u201cdevelop to sustainability\\u201d\\u2019 (Cumming and Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2018: 9533). For instance, this interpretation of the plastics marine problem based on economic growth has shaped the continued waste exchange from the global north to the south, the (lack of) recycling systems, and the prioritisation of corporate self-regulation. In this context, although marine plastics pollution continues to be framed under economic discourses, it will perpetuate the problem.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr49-00208523231183909\", \"bibr25-00208523231183909\", \"bibr37-00208523231183909\", \"bibr49-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Theoretical implications\", \"text\": \"This paper contributes novel insights into SD literature by specifying the main salient features that can be used either individually or collectively to characterise \\u2018science\\u2019 and \\u2018diplomacy\\u2019 functions. In this context, the SD features can shed light on the opportunities and limitations facing transboundary environmental problems, particularly identifying forms of governance that are supported by SD features that can potentially emerge to be more relevant. As a newly emerging area, however, SD does not have clearly delineated legal jurisdictions. Recent attempts from R\\u00fcffin (2020), based on the theoretical notions of MLG from Marks and Hooghe (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Marks and Hooghe, 2004), conceptualise SD as a Type II MLG system in which \\u2018Policies concerning SD might touch upon innumerable jurisdictions\\u2019 (R\\u00fcffin, 2020: 3).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10933700\", \"pmid\": \"38481579\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bibr8-00208523231183909\", \"bibr35-00208523231183909\"], \"section\": \"Limitations and future research\", \"text\": \"In advancing environmental governance, the case of plastics pollution in the ocean based on a documentary review and analysis draws attention to the link between SD salient features and international policies for marine plastics pollution. Although this methodology has its merits to accomplish the review and the analysis, it may be biased in representing a complete account of the problem. Further studies with empirical data from interviews with the main international stakeholders should investigate the subsequent question of whether the SD perspective and its application in Type II MLG are feasible, and its implications, taking into account the countries dependency on plastic production and consumption. At the same time, it would be worthwhile reviewing its implications for alternative plastic materials such as bioplastics and their supply chains issues described by Beltran et al. (2021) and Liliani et al. (2020), and comparing similar studies for transboundary problems. For instance, the battles between science and policy played out in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate change agenda.\"}]"

Metadata

"{\"typesetter\": \"ts19\"}"