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Why nature matters: A systematic review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values

PMCID: PMC10831222

PMID: 38313563

Abstract

Abstract In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature . We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is sufficiently inclusive to serve as an umbrella over different understandings in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values. Finally, we discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve the methods for valuation of nature's contributions to people, including ecosystem services, to inform policy and direct future research.

Full Text

The ways individuals, communities, and societies express, embody, or articulate the importance of nature and people–nature relationships take many forms. This diversity has important implications for research, policy, and valuation around nature and nature's contributions to people (NCP), including ecosystem services (Anderson et al. 2022, IPBES 2022). Recent publications emphasize the need to focus on the multiple and diverse values of nature to achieve socially equitable and environmentally sustainable outcomes (Chan et al. 2016, Himes and Muraca 2018, Kenter et al. 2019, Köhler et al. 2019, Zafra-Calvo et al. 2020, IPBES 2022). Simultaneously, numerous international bodies have recognized this need. In this vein, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) commissioned and approved the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature (hereafter, the values assessment), in which the organization found that policy decisions have been largely based on a narrow set of market values of nature, underpinning the global biodiversity crisis. The values assessment concludes that identifying multiple values and incorporating them into policymaking provides leverage points for transformative change toward more just and sustainable futures, in line with Agenda 2030, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, and other multilateral agreements (CBD 2022, IPBES 2022, Pascual et al. 2023, United Nations 2023).
The values assessment proposes a typology to synthesize ways of conceptualizing the values of nature across diverse disciplines and knowledge systems (IPBES 2022). Accordingly, nature's values may be organized on the basis of four interrelated dimensions: worldviews and knowledge systems (ontologies and ways individuals or groups interpret, inhabit, and modify the world around them), broad values (life goals and guiding principles), specific values (opinions and judgments about the importance and meaning of something in specific contexts), and value indicators (the quantitative measures or qualitative descriptions of importance given to specific values; Raymond et al. 2023).
In the present article, we focus on the dimension of specific values, using the most common classification found in the academic literature: intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values (IPBES 2022). Within the wider values typology, specific values reflect how people, communities, and societies justify why and how nature and people–nature relationships are important to them. They represent historical contributions from, inter alia, environmental education, environmental ethics, conservation biology, and ecosystem services literatures. Researchers in these disciplines have sought to address the value of nature for its own sake, nature's benefit to people, and the value of noninstrumental and meaningful people–nature relationships (Díaz et al. 2015, Chan et al. 2016).
As part of the values assessment, we conducted a systematic literature review of these three specific value types to identify core meanings, trends, themes, disciplinary discrepancies, areas of convergence, and policy implications (see Anderson et al. 2022). Following the IPBES methods guidelines, the review process was documented and made publicly available in an annex to the values assessment (Muraca and Gould 2022), and its results are presented and discussed in the present article to (1) identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts in the wider typology of values developed in the values assessment; (2) to determine a core meaning for each value type that is inclusive enough to serve as an umbrella over different uses in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values; and (3) to discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve methods for pluralistic valuation of NCP (including ecosystem services), inform policy, and direct future research.
The literature review encompassed a systematized search, a qualitative analysis based on interpretive coding, and critical interpretive synthesis (figure 1; Dixon-Woods et al. 2006, Macura et al. 2019). The publicly available protocol guarantees the traceability and repeatability of the search process by documenting the search strings, the selection (inclusions and exclusions) criteria, and the interpretative codes used by all reviewers. We chose four academic databases (Web of Science, EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, Google Scholar, and SCOPUS) to guarantee a wide spectrum of sources and to mitigate known disciplinary biases (Mongeon and Paul-Hus 2016). The searches were conducted in English in April 2020, with no limits on publication dates. The search terms in titles, keywords, abstracts, or subjects were adjusted according to the particular database structure and were focused on combinations of value terms (intrinsic value, instrumental value, relational value) with nature-related terms (ecosystem services, nature's contributions to people, or nature; see Muraca and Gould 2022 for details).
The process and workflow of systematic literature review for intrinsic, instrumental, and relational specific values. For further information and data management report, see Muraca and Gould (2022).
After these eliminations, we coded 239 articles. The reviewers analyzed the literature on the basis of a shared codebook with categories relevant to the values assessment (see Muraca and Gould 2022). The coding was carried out as a form of qualitative content analysis; the majority of the codes entailed descriptive content as opposed to a predefined typology or data range.
For the interpretive critical analysis, the following five codes were analyzed: general information (the location of the study, the location of the first author's institution, and if the paper was an empirical work, a review, or a perspective); the worldviews directly or indirectly addressed (biocentric or ecocentric, strong anthropocentric, weak anthropocentric, pluricentric, or other, according to the IPBES values assessment; IPBES 2022); the ways in which people–nature relationships were otherwise expressed (e.g., connection to nature, human–nature relatedness, biocultural diversity, sacred landscapes); whether and which value types were explicitly or implicitly addressed (i.e., intrinsic, instrumental, relational) and how the value types were defined (verbatim quotes) or indirectly described or intended (verbatim quotes or paraphrase); and policy relevance (the impact on policy of multiple value types, including value pluralism).
Finally, we assess patterns of relevant associations between the three specific value types and worldviews most frequently related to people–nature relationships as identified within the values assessment (i.e., anthropocentric, bio- or ecocentric, and pluricentric; Anderson et al. 2022). Relevant associations were noted when the reviewer interpreted that the paper aligned with a particular worldview and included explicit references to worldviews in quotes or by paraphrasing implicit references.
We also realized that papers rooted in Indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) approaches were poorly represented in our data set. We collaborated with other experts within the values assessment, who had completed a parallel literature review on ILK, and invited them to complement the results of the interpretive synthesis by analyzing implicit expressions of the three value types in their data and offering correctives, comments, and examples (Athayde 2022).
Since the first identified reference in 1985 in the searched databases (Førsund 1985), the number of publications on intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values has increased steadily over time. There is a marked increase in literature related to specific values in the early 2000s, coinciding with the work of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the publication of the initial Ecosystems and Human Well-Being report (MEA 2005). Another period of growth in the 2010s corresponds to the publication of The Economics of Ecosystem and Biodiversity (TEEB) in 2010 and the initiation of IPBES (established in 2012, conceptual framework published in 2015; Dıaz et al. 2015). Although intrinsic and instrumental values were present in the literature across the whole period, the first explicit mention of relational values occurred in 2016, after the introduction of the IPBES conceptual framework (Díaz et al. 2015) and the foundational paper by Chan and colleagues (2016), which popularized the term and drew on the concept as presented in Muraca (2011), but these three papers were not recovered using our search criteria (see the “Study limitations” section). However, earlier papers implicitly evoked the concept of relational values. Intrinsic and instrumental values are most prevalent in early years; then the number of relational values publications catches up, contributing substantially to the overall increase in publications on the specific values of nature (figure 2). It should be noted that the use of relational categories to understand society– or community–nature relationships significantly predates the introduction of the term relational values, especially in sociology and anthropology (Emirbayer 1997, Viveiros De Castro 2004).
The annual number of publications from 1985 to 2019 that focus on specific values of nature. The callouts indicate pivotal framework publications, posited to affect research on the values of nature, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB 2010), and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services’ conceptual framework (Díaz et al. 2015). Many of the papers referred to more than one value type, so the cumulative number of publications (the dashed line) is less than the sum of each specific value (the columns).
The publications came from first (lead) authors with affiliations in 40 different countries. The largest number were from the United States (63), followed by the United Kingdom (29), Australia (22), the Netherlands (16), Canada (16), and Sweden (12), with other countries represented by fewer than 10 publications (figure 3).
The papers were classified as perspectives, including theoretical, conceptual, philosophical, and editorial pieces (46%); empirical studies (40%); and review articles (13%). Most of the papers referred to intrinsic (77%) or instrumental (67%) values. The publications focusing on relational values accounted for 34% of the reviewed papers. Although intrinsic and instrumental values had similar proportions of empirical (37% and 40%, respectively), perspective (51% and 48%, respectively), and review publications (11% and 12%, respectively), the relational values literature had a comparatively larger percentage of empirical (44%) and review (21%) articles with a corresponding lower percentage of perspectives (35%; figure 4).
Table 1 summarizes the most relevant results from the qualitative analysis and interpretive critical synthesis, which classified each value type according to its core meaning, salient articulations, and relevant associations with worldviews and other concepts. Identifying a sufficiently distinct core meaning on the basis of relevant salient articulations for each value type on the ground of a review of interdisciplinary literature helps define each semantic field more clearly. It is also helpful for identifying categories and codes in valuations studies and empirical research and as reference basis for comparability across studies.
With respect to the relevant associations with worldviews, we generally followed the categorization of worldviews articulated in the values assessment values typology (IPBES 2022). Accordingly, biocentric and ecocentric worldviews were considered together, despite their differentiation in environmental ethics, because they share a nonanthropocentric perspective and can both be considered nature centered. Anthropocentrism is presented on a spectrum between weak or relational (recognizing human dependence on other beings) and strong or narrow (human superiority over other species) anthropocentrism. Pluricentric worldviews focus on a web of reciprocal and systemic relationships between human and other-than-human beings.
The term intrinsic value with reference to other-than-human beings is used in the literature with different, sometimes confused, meanings (O'Neill 1992, 1993). Intrinsic values are characterized as opposite to instrumental values, as the value of something that is an end in itself, as values independent of human judgment, as independent of human interests or well-being, and as the inherent moral value (in the sense of being a holder of rights) of other-than-human beings. In the IPBES conceptual framework, intrinsic values are equated to nonanthropocentric values and defined as the value of an entity independent of how it relates to humans (Pascual et al. 2017). In this section, we do not engage with theoretical discussions of appropriate or inappropriate uses and definitions but summarize and analyze the findings from the literature review.
Considering these differences and variations of use, we propose the following definition as an operational core meaning of intrinsic value: “values of other-than-human beings expressed independently of any reference to humans as valuers, including values associated with entities worth protecting as ends in and of themselves.” This definition serves as an umbrella meaning for most salient articulations by focusing on the justification behind them. Accordingly, expressing that other-than-human beings have intrinsic value does not necessarily mean that they have no relation to people (Sagoff 2009) but that the reason they are valued is explicitly expressed regardless of that relationship (Himes and Muraca 2018). This can include recognizing that nonhuman beings have their own interests and needs that warrant consideration (Rolston 1993, Sandler 2010, Berry et al. 2018). The definition is consistent with biocentric worldviews (King 2006, Batavia and Nelson 2017, Piccolo 2017) and aims at bridging subjective (people attributing intrinsic value to nature) and objective (value existing in nature regardless of people's attribution) understandings of value. To account for perspectives insisting on the objective nature of values, we added to the definition a reference to the understanding of intrinsic values as the value of entities that are worth protecting as ends in themselves. Framed this way, intrinsic values are not only assessed through biophysical indicators, such as abundance and endemism, but can also be subjectively articulated by people (Callicott 2002), who might act on them and acknowledge consequences to or rights for other-than-human nature (O'Connor and Kenter 2019).
We identified five salient articulations of intrinsic value (table 1). The first defines intrinsic values negatively as noninstrumental values (e.g., Weesie and van Andel 2008, Fürst 2015, Vucetich et al. 2015). This salient articulation is straightforward and often implicitly presupposed in literature on intrinsic values, but the negative definition has limited usefulness by itself unless a strict dualism between intrinsic and instrumental values is assumed.
The next salient articulation defines intrinsic values as the value of something that is an end in itself or has agency. Within this articulation, we include descriptions of nonhuman nature being valuable for its own sake (e.g., Lockwood 1999, Reyers et al. 2012).
Furthermore, intrinsic value is described as independent of being valued or recognized by a (human) valuer (e.g., Dion 2000, Hovardas 2013, Gale and Ednie 2019). This includes reference to inherent properties of an entity and to the objective value of nonhuman nature that exists regardless of human preferences, attitudes, or even their existence (Sheng et al. 2019). In the literature, this articulation is often presented in terms of nonanthropocentric values.
Intrinsic value is also articulated as the value of nonhuman nature regardless of its usefulness to humans or human well-being (e.g., Ghilarov 2000, Devos et al. 2019, Hugé et al. 2020). This understanding includes what is commonly known as subjective intrinsic values, which refers to values attributed by people to something that is valuable for its own sake to them and not for its usefulness; this category often includes aesthetic values (van Koppen 2000, Swift et al. 2004, Schröter et al. 2014).
Intrinsic value is used to address the inherent moral value of other-than-human beings, including arguments for nonhuman nature's rights to exist and other rights-based justifications (e.g., Alho 2008, Falk-Andersson et al. 2015, Sarkki et al. 2019). It resonates with biocentric conservation and some animal rights literature (Regan 1992, Rolston 1993, Batavia and Nelson 2017), which often imply moral obligations toward other-than-human entities (Schuler et al. 2017), and sometimes with the language of existence value intended as the right to exist regardless of function (Pearson 2016).
Intrinsic values are strongly and often explicitly associated with nonanthropocentric worldviews (Kahn 1997, Freemuth 2001, King 2006, Gilbert et al. 2009). This is not surprising, because most of the salient articulations of intrinsic value focus on the value of nature as independent or separate from humans or insist on the stand-alone value of other-than-human life.
Intrinsic values also tend to be associated with broad values that emphasize moral obligations toward nonhuman nature, other living things, or life in general (e.g., Harrop 2013, Gray and Curry 2016, Öhman et al. 2016), whether it be animals, species, all living beings, or ecosystems. Less commonly, intrinsic values were associated with sacred values, other-regarding, or biospheric broad values (Hattingh 2014, May 2017).
We propose an operational core meaning of instrumental value as “values of other-than-human entities, as means to achieve human ends or satisfy human preferences.” This core meaning includes “economic values, regardless of whether the entity is directly or indirectly used or not used” (Brondizio et al. 2019, p. 22). Accordingly, natural entities are important not in themselves but insofar as they provide (potential) utility to humans (Chan et al. 2016) or support communities’ economic well-being or subsistence (Lau et al. 2019, Hugé et al. 2020). This is expressed in many second-generation constitutions (i.e., constitutions that refer to social rights; Jung et al. 2014), which recognize people's right to a clean environment. Because instrumental values refers to a means to an end, the means might be substitutable (Schröter et al. 2020), at least in principle, even if not always in practice: That is, it is acceptable to consider equivalents or substitutes, if any are available or possible, that can provide similar benefits.
We identified three salient articulations, often overlapping, of instrumental values. The first refers to the value of other-than-human nature as means to an end (e.g., Lockwood 1999, Reyers et al. 2012, James 2020). In most cases, the end is intended as usefulness, utility, or benefits, for humans, although some scholars also stress the instrumental value of something as a means for ends set by other-than-human beings (Piccolo 2017).
The second refers to the satisfaction of needs, preferences, interests, or desires (e.g., Öhman et al. 2016, Jones and Tobin 2018, Gale and Ednie 2019). The papers using this salient articulation sometimes refer to nonuse benefits of nature, usually referencing the total economic value (TEV) classification (TEEB 2010), including altruistic, bequest, or existence value types (Hattingh 2014, Farrell et al. 2017, Christie et al. 2019).
The last salient articulation refers to nature's value as a resource for the delivery of ecosystem services, as an asset, capital, or property (e.g., Beltrani 1997, Bonnett 2012, BenDor et al. 2014, Batavia et al. 2018, Berry et al. 2018). This includes reference to the importance of sustainable use and environmental policy to maintain or enhance natural capital. Currently, this understanding is best articulated in TEEB (2010) and by the recent Dasgupta review, in which nature is defined as an asset (Dasgupta 2021).
Instrumental values are strongly and explicitly associated with ecosystem services and anthropocentric worldviews (Kahn 1997, Reyers et al. 2012, Hovardas 2013). In almost all cases, the ends of instrumental values and the beneficiary of nature's resources or services was human (e.g., Winter and Lockwood 2004, Pelenc et al. 2013, Bremer et al. 2018). Instrumental values also tended to be strongly and explicitly associated with utilitarianism and paradigms of managing nature (Alho 2008, Falk-Andersson et al. 2015, Farrell et al. 2017).
Given the more recent history of the use of relational values as a specific value in environmental literature, different meanings and uses of the term coexist. There is ongoing debate whether they are a separate type of value (Norton and Sanbeg 2021, James 2022, Luque-Lora 2023, Piccolo et al. 2022) or whether they should be considered as a boundary object (Stålhammar and Thorén 2019). We do not engage in the debate in the present article, but rather focus on how relational values are presented in the reviewed literature. The term is often used in the literature to express the value of noninstrumental human–nature relationships or emphasize relationships that are, in principle, not substitutable and lose their meaning if translated into narrowly instrumental language (Jax et al. 2013, Arias-Arévalo et al. 2017, Klain et al. 2017, Chan et al. 2018, Himes and Muraca 2018), as in the case of friendship, which is important precisely because of the relationship but loses its meaning if reduced to a means to an end (O'Neill et al. 2008). The language of intrinsic values is generally not helpful to articulate relational values, because most framings of intrinsic values explicitly disregard relationships in the justification of importance.
We propose the core meaning of relational values as the “values of meaningful, and often reciprocal human relationships—beyond means to an end—with nature and among people through nature, where nature is often specified as a particular landscape, place, species, forest, etc.” (Chan et al. 2016, Chan et al. 2018, De Vos et al. 2018, Himes and Muraca 2018, Schröter et al. 2020). Relational values are frequently framed as context dependent, often place-based, nontradable, and therefore largely not substitutable in principle (Kenter et al. 2019). They refer to complex human–nature relationships that are integral to a good quality of life and are important for how some people understand themselves as living in and through reciprocal relationships of responsibility in the bioculturally diverse world they inhabit (McGregor 2010, Kimmerer 2011).
First, close to the core meaning, as it was used more or less explicitly in the majority of the analyzed papers, relational values are intended as the values of or deriving from desirable, meaningful, just, and reciprocal relationships of people with nature and among people through nature (Chan et al. 2016, Schröter et al. 2020). The term often overlaps with other salient articulations that emphasize more specific types of relationships and is frequently evoked by citing the foundational Chan and colleagues (2016) paper or the IPBES framework's definition of relational values.
Second, relational values refers to values relative to or deriving from relationships that are constituent parts of people's identity (cultural, individual or collective; Musschenga 2004, De Vos et al. 2018, Gould et al. 2019). This articulation is helpful in expressing the value of people–nature relationships for indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC). For example, in the New Zealand agreement between the Indigenous Whanganui Iwi (Māori) people and the Crown, the river Te Awa Tupua is acknowledged as connected with the identity of the iwi and hapū in an inalienable way, because the document literally says, “I am the River and the river is me” (Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 2017).
Third, relational values refers to values relative to or deriving from relationships that are constituent elements for living a good life. This includes relationships with people and nature that are essential components of a meaningful and flourishing life (eudaimonia), worthy of a human being, including virtues and attitudes of responsibility (Klain et al. 2017, Jax et al. 2018, Schröter et al. 2020). For instance, Knippenberg and colleagues (2018, p. 43) insisted that “good relations are key constituents of the good life” and propose the concept of nature-inclusive eudaimonia, in which nature is considered constitutive of human flourishing.
Fourth, relational values are associated with sense of place (De Vos et al. 2018, Marshall et al. 2019, Skubel et al. 2019, Basu et al. 2020) and interconnected with cultural and sacred landscapes (e.g., Jax et al. 2018, Köhler et al. 2019, Sarkki et al. 2019). Examples include plural valuations of nature in protected areas (e.g., De Vos et al. 2018, Mrotek et al. 2019), values that motivate preservation of a specific landscape such as the sense of pride reported by Calcagni and colleagues (2019) by citizens of Chattanooga that builds connections between people and their city through a unique sense of place and culture. This articulation also includes landscapes that are sacred or have spiritual meaning such as wakas, or sacred sanctuaries, of Andean peoples, which are places for connection and renewal (May 2017).
Fifth, values associated with care for or about specific landscapes, places, human and nonhuman others, including values of responsibility and reciprocity (Gould et al. 2018, Jax et al. 2018, De Vreese et al. 2019), such as reciprocal responsibilities of giving and receiving between people and the natural world (May 2017, Norgaard et al. 2017). For example, in South America's Quechua language, reciprocity, or ayni, is the glue that holds everything together (May 2017), and in Hawaii, e mālama i ka ’aina means “take care of the land” (Gould et al. 2019). In northern California, for Karuk fishers, the “responsibilities to the natural world include ceremonial management of the fishery to ensure ‘escapement’ and burning of the forest to enhance runoff” (Norgaard et al. 2017, p. 103).
The final salient articulation of relational values refers to values of nature as a point of connection among people, binding communities together and supporting social networks (e.g., Norgaard et al. 2017, García-Llorente et al. 2018, Skubel et al. 2019). Many papers that fit this salient articulation reference Pascual and colleagues’ (2017, p. 12) assertion that “relational values reflect elements of… social cohesion,” but common and more detailed accounts are found in ILK literature; for example, Skubel and colleagues (2019) described how the Rrumburryia clan of the Yanyuwa people in northern Australia tell a story of “The Tiger Shark (Ngurdrungurdu) Dreaming,” which exemplifies how sharks are part of what binds humans and other-than-human nature together, or the agdal system, a traditional Berber form of environmental management in North Africa in which reciprocal relationships with the natural world are essential for supporting community cohesion, cultural coherence, and social networks (Dominguez et al. 2012). This articulation is also evident in intergenerational connections made through relationships to farming a place and farming as a way of life identified in interview responses of farmers in the US Northwest (Chapman et al. 2019).
Relational values are very strongly associated with pluricentric worldviews, which question the strict separation between nature and culture, society, or humanity and stress the interdependence between all beings (May 2017, Saxena et al. 2018, Devos et al. 2019, Gould et al. 2019). They are also very strongly associated with broad values of stewardship, responsibility, care, affection, reciprocity, harmony with nature, good life, and justice (Gudynas and Acosta 2011, De Vreese et al. 2019). Finally, relational values are also associated with cultural ecosystem services and spirituality (e.g., Harrop 2013, Hofstra 2017, Köhler et al. 2019).
We found, in some contexts, that the meanings of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values are contested and may overlap (Pascual et al. 2017, Himes and Muraca 2018, Schröter et al. 2020), creating fuzzy boundaries. For instance, we found—not surprisingly—overlapping meanings between relational and instrumental values with respect to material NCP such as food, which may have instrumental and relational value, depending on the context and local practices. For example, in Mahahe, wild fruit groves are appreciated instrumentally, for the important additions to the diet and the shade they offer, as well as relationally, as a gathering place for communing with each other and nature (Schnegg et al. 2014). These wild fruit groves simultaneously have instrumental and relational values to the Mahahe. Identifying fuzzy boundaries helps articulate the full measure of their importance to the community, which can otherwise not be adequately expressed by a single value type. At the same time, being able to analytically distinguish between instrumental and relational value articulations can help identify or monitor shifts in how the community understands their relationships with the trees or differentiate value articulations by age or economic status.
Justifications based on instrumental and intrinsic values often overlap when sentient animals are seen as ends in themselves and reducing their suffering could be justified under a utilitarian framework as instrumentally good for them (Rolston 1993, King 2006, Harrop 2013). In other instances, relational and subjective intrinsic value (something is important for someone for its own sake) or intrinsic value defined negatively as noninstrumental might be hard to distinguish. In other cases, fuzzy boundaries extend to all three value types, as with the sense of place. In many cases, relational values are equated with values of specific places (Devos et al. 2019) or a sense of place (Skubel et al. 2019); in other cases, intrinsic (Gruen 2002, Bonnett 2012), instrumental (Runhaar et al. 2019), or both types of values (Blennow et al. 2019) are attributed to the importance of place. The literature suggests that values can be socially or symbolically constructed through relationships with others in places (relational values), the sense of place can also be associated with the material properties of places (instrumental meanings) or the intangible emotional, symbolic, and spiritual meanings of places (expressed as relational or subjective intrinsic values; Raymond et al. 2010, Williams 2014).
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in more detail three fuzzy boundaries that we identified repeatedly where all three value types converged: nonuse values, aesthetic values, and values linked to life support processes, which we term life-support values (figure 5). We draw occasionally on additional literature from the value assessment besides the data collected for the systematic literature search in order to clarify concepts, introduce general themes, or support explanations with additional, relevant examples. Although the evidence of overlapping use of different value types was evident in the literature, indicating the existence of these fuzzy boundaries, the discussion of reasons for the fuzzy boundaries and potential significance for policy, practice, and decision-making results from the author's interpretation of the findings.
The term nonuse values originated in the economic literature and is distinguished from use values, as in the TEV framework. Use values refers to the satisfaction generated by the direct (consumptive or nonconsumptive) or indirect (the conditions that enable use or satisfaction) use of ecosystem services or NCP. Nonuse values “are based on the preference for components of nature's existence without the valuer using or experiencing it and are of three types: existence value, altruistic value, and bequest value” (Pascual et al. 2017, pp. 11–12). Besides this specific economic meaning, the term nonuse values is employed to articulate some instrumental values that cannot be represented straightforwardly in monetary terms or via market exchanges—for example, the rights of future generations to biodiversity or nature components (Winter and Lockwood 2004, Haggan 2011). Nonuse values are also sometimes evoked to express intrinsic values generally (Swift et al. 2004) or as synonymous with existence value (Buijs 2009, Zhang et al. 2013), and we identified implicit references to relational values in descriptions of nonuse values—for example, with reference to altruistic values (More et al. 1996, Pearson 2016).
From a theoretical point of view, interpreting existence value or altruistic value in terms of intrinsic or relational justifications results from a misinterpretation of the economic language (Kenter et al. 2015). Framing intrinsic and relational values in terms of TEV nonuse values might have consequences in terms of environmental and epistemic justice or might fail to adequately represent the complexity of environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier 2002), leading to inadequate policies to address them (Anderson et al. 2022). For example, people generally perceive intrinsic values and many relational values as nonnegotiable and reject their reduction to the language of preferences, leading to environmental conflicts (Temper 2019).
However, the less specific uses that occur in the literature may help identify instances when multiple values are at play and highlight attempts at finding a common language across groups (see box 1). Moreover, nonuse values, within limitations, may serve as indicators for when intrinsic or relational values are present but likely cannot be used to assess the full meaning of those values without complimentary, noneconomic indicators (see figure 6 in box 1).
Total economic value (TEV) is based on a utilitarian, preference-based understanding of value that represents nonuse values in terms of the satisfaction generated for an individual by knowing that others will have access to nature's benefits, be it current (altruist value) or future generations (bequest value), or by knowing that something exists, even if there is no direct access to or direct enjoyment of it (existence value; Hansjürgens 2014, Anderson et al. 2022). The focus on preferences is mostly anthropocentric and instrumental, where value is assigned to biodiversity or ecosystem services “to the extent that these fulfill needs or confer satisfaction to humans either directly or indirectly” (TEEB 2010, p. 187). This implies that existence, bequest, and altruistic values are represented according to an instrumental value justification that allows for trade-offs, commensurability, and potential substitutability across the objects of value (Kenter et al. 2015, Anderson et al. 2022). As acknowledged by TEEB itself, nonuse values present “greater challenges for valuation than do use values since nonuse values are related to moral, religious or aesthetic properties, for which markets usually do not exist” (TEEB 2010, p. 196).
The total economic value classification framework encompasses multiple environmental value types. The figure presents a spectrum between stronger and weaker assumptions of substitutability between the objects of value. Source: The figure was adapted from the values assessment's chapter 2 (Anderson et al. 2022).
Although the TEV approach aims to capture instrumental values, other value types sometimes can be indirectly identified by framing them in the language of preferences (see figure 6). By borrowing language from Schröter and colleagues (2020), who employ socioecological indicators as proxies for relational values, we propose, in a similar vein, to use, when legitimate and within limitations, TEV categories as indirect proxies that can help identify that a preference for a value is present but cannot estimate the strength of that preference compared to others, nor can they be accurately used to assess the full meaning of that value. In these cases, noneconomic indicators should be added to replace TEV to better address environmental conflicts, and to support epistemic and recognition justice.
Aesthetic values are also addressed under all three categories in the literature. In terms of intrinsic value, the beauty of nature, a place, or an other-than-human entity is considered valuable for its own sake regardless and independently of usefulness to people and it is nonnegotiable (van Koppen 2000, Swift et al. 2004, Schröter et al. 2014, Marshall et al. 2019). In terms of instrumental value, beauty is conceived as a preference for a beautiful state of affairs over a different less beautiful state or because it causes aesthetic pleasure and can be expressed as willingness to pay or via hedonic valuation (the value of real estate in the vicinity of ‘beautiful’ green areas; van der Ploeg et al. 2011, Winter 2017).
In papers explicitly using the relational value concept, aesthetic values are defined as relational and noninstrumental; beauty is understood in terms of a relation to a specific place, landscape, ecosystem, or species that deeply informs the identity of an individual or community and their sense of belonging or willingness to care for that place (i.e., aesthetic experience is considered as an essential component of a good life; Muraca 2011, Saner and Bordt 2016, Schröter et al. 2020). Implicit references to relational values include, in our interpretation, the understanding of aesthetic appreciation as connected to sympathy toward and living in harmony with nature (Gao 2016). In this sense, articulating beauty only in terms preferences and trade-offs between them is firmly resisted, and the importance of the relation between valuer and valued object is highlighted (Deplazes-Zemp and Chapman 2021). Instead of considering this fuzzy boundary as a problem requiring a more precise or “right” articulation of aesthetic values, embracing the fuzziness can reinforce the importance of aesthetics and beauty as common ground across groups using different justifications. This common ground can be leveraged for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems.
The value of life-supporting processes, functions, and systems—interrelating biophysical, spiritual, or symbolic aspects—and relationships of dependence and interdependence with respect to them was also expressed in terms of all three value types. To account for these concepts found in the literature under the frame of intrinsic, instrumental, or relational values, we introduce the operational term life-support values (figure 7).
Within the semantic field of each value type, life-support values are largely described as not substitutable and foundational for other environmental values. Under intrinsic values, life-support values are framed in the literature as the importance of evolutionary and ecological processes that are independent of people's judgments, including the Earth system as a whole (Rolston 1993, Kahn 1997, Pelenc et al. 2013, Hattingh 2014, Fritz-Vietta 2016, Piccolo 2017), which enable other values (Rolston 1988). Under instrumental values, life-support values are framed in terms of ecological functions or as the value of the biotic and abiotic prerequisites for the functional reliability and the self-organization of the ecological systems and apply to the importance of supporting ecosystem services (Rolston 1993, Ghilarov 2000, MEA 2005, Farnsworth et al. 2012, Bottazzi et al. 2018), indirect use values or primary values (Hansjürgens 2014, Fritz-Vietta 2016), functional values (Lockwood 1999), critical natural capital (Battistoni 2017), and regulating NCP (Díaz et al. 2015). Under relational values, life-support values are presented in terms of fundamental values (Muraca 2011, Arias-Arévalo et al. 2018, Schröter et al. 2020) that express the importance of life-supporting processes that give sense to people's existence and identity. The latter is not limited to biophysical aspects but also includes the spiritual and symbolic meaning of life-giving and life-regenerating processes in specific contexts (e.g., contextual NCP), including, with reference to biophilia, “innate and beneficial connections with nature” (Ross et al. 2018, p. 47) or in terms of lifeworlds (Reis Cunha 2017). Examples include the Andean Indigenous concept of Pachamama, referring to Earth's generative powers and to the very constitution of life (Silverblatt 1987, Pacari 2009, Macas 2010, Tola 2018) and the contextual spiritual foundations for the regeneration of life, practices, and reciprocal relations the Dongria people express for India's Niyamgiri Mountains, which “not only provide the people with life and livelihoods, [but] they are also worshiped as the upholders of the Earth and the laws of the Universe” (Supreme Court of India 1995).
In earlier science–policy interface documents, such as the MEA, mainly intrinsic and instrumental values are presented and typically depicted in dichotomic opposition (something may either have dignity—intrinsic value—or a price—instrumental value; MEA 2005). This dichotomy is represented in the salient articulation of intrinsic values defined negatively as noninstrumental value but can be further mapped onto two predominant approaches in the general environmental discourse. For instance, the fields of conservation biology and environmental ethics both invoke salient articulations of intrinsic values as the value of natural processes and systems “regardless of importance or usefulness to humans” and “the inherent moral value of natural beings (right to exist).” With the introduction of the CBD and the ecosystem services framework, instrumental (and relational) language has become more relevant in the debate (Norton 1991, Justus et al. 2009, Sagoff 2009, Batavia and Nelson 2017). In the sustainability discourse and in environmental and ecological economics, the language of instrumental value is increasingly dominant, primarily emphasizing the salient articulation of nature's value as a resource for ecosystem services, as an asset, capital, or property (Daily 1997, TEEB 2010).
However, despite being used in opposition, we found that the definitions of intrinsic and instrumental values sometimes overlap. Before the introduction of relational values to the environmental literature, many salient articulations of relational values would be designated confusingly as both intrinsic and instrumental. Since their introduction, relational values helped clarify the meaning and scope of environmental values in areas where instrumental and intrinsic value definitions overlapped, were inconsistent, or were not very clear, as is the case with identity-constituting relationships or social cohesion. Giving an explicit name to these values made them more visible and facilitated empirical research and assessments needed for policy (Christie et al. 2019, De Vreese et al. 2019, Chapman et al. 2020). The addition of relational values, to articulate the importance of noninstrumental relationships with nature and as a distinct value types (Muraca 2011, Chan et al. 2016), can mitigate confusing uses of intrinsic and instrumental values but only if scholars are willing to adopt it in their interpretation of literature predating the widespread use of the term relational values. This can be done more easily by keying in on salient articulations and relevant associations of relational values in earlier literature as indicators and evidence of implied relational values (e.g., values associated with spiritual meaning and the importance of caring and reciprocal relationships with nature). Recognizing relational values in earlier literature becomes more important as recent trends in the literature signal greater interest by empirical researchers to engage with them.
The success of relational values in valuation studies might also have indirectly contributed to narrowing down the semantic domain of instrumental values. Although from a theoretical point of view this might be contentious, being able to distinguish instrumental and relational domains in practice can improve the implementation of environmental policy affecting diverse communities (Lliso et al. 2022).
Finding appropriate language to represent the diverse values of NCP and ecosystem services has important policy ramifications (Campagna et al. 2017). We believe that each value type provides a distinct and important mode of communicating and justifying the importance of nature and people–nature relationships. By isolating specific core meanings from the literature, the relevance and limitations of each value type for policy and valuation of ecosystem services and NCP can be more clearly identified and different trajectories of values enquiry clarified. Moreover, fuzzy boundaries between different value types, once they are identified, are logical areas to find or build common ground between parties with different conceptualizations of value or resource management interests (Raymond et al. 2023).
Intrinsic values, as they are defined by the proposed core meaning in the present article, are considered, as we found in the reviewed literature, essential in environmental policy to sustain and trigger people's motivation for conservation (Polasky et al. 2012, Batavia and Nelson 2017), in education (Zhang et al. 2013), and to articulate the agency of other-than-human beings as expressed, for example, by Quechua communities in Peru about the mountain Ausangate as a powerful earth being (De La Cadena 2010). Intrinsic values are also closely associated with biocentric and ecocentric worldviews that continue to be important conceptualizations of nature in support of conservation. Appealing to intrinsic values can help legitimize environmental protections and improve policy success but may sometimes lack consideration of pragmatic elements relevant to environmental management (Minteer et al. 2004, O'Connor and Kenter 2019) or may disregard relational frameworks connecting people and land (Chapman et al. 2019).
Instrumental values, as they are defined according to the proposed core meaning in the present article, lend themselves, as we found in the literature, to quantitative analysis favored in valuation of ecosystem services and material NCP or resource management planning for sustainable development. Because they are substitutable in principle, they support high comparability and commensurability, which facilitates trade-off assessments that can be articulated in monetary units—for example, by adopting cost–benefit analysis or contingent valuation (Larréré and Larrére 2007). However, narrowly instrumental approaches to valuation that only consider, for example, monetary values may obscure other value expressions, crowd out other reasons for environmental protection (Rico García-Amado et al. 2013), alienate stakeholders (De Vreese et al. 2019), and misrepresent conflicts (Hattingh 2014). For example, as was shown in a case study about perceptions of the benefits from and threats to nature in Tierra del Fuego National Park in Argentina, assuming that stakeholders are only motivated by monetary gains does not correspond to the values expressed by the park's primary users and prevents environmental management to better align with public perceptions and needs (Mrotek et al. 2019).
In policymaking, relational values, as they are defined according to the proposed core meaning in the present article, can help articulate, as has emerged from the literature review, the idea that a specific place—a forest, a river, a landscape, or a population—are essentially important to people because of the unique relationships, history, and traditions that bind them together, as is expressed, for example, in the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsurō’s concept of fūdo (風土), which refers to interrelationships between people and local characteristics (Prominski 2014). To date, relational values in policy documents primarily highlight targets and strategies rather than direct specific actions, but the academic literature suggests that they can benefit policies directly by accounting for contextual NCP (Díaz et al. 2018). Integrating relational values into policy actions can help operationalize broad policy guidance (e.g., IPBES) to regional, national, and local scales (Kitheka et al. 2019). Relational values can catalyze motivation and appeal to a broader audience (Stenseke 2018, Winkler and Hauck 2019), particularly for IPLC (Himes and Muraca 2018, Gould et al. 2019) and can increase the participation of different stakeholders (Jax et al. 2018, Kitheka et al. 2019). By stressing reciprocal relationships, they can facilitate social equity and environmental sustainability (Kenter et al. 2011, Diver et al. 2019). Although relational values can be assessed using sociocultural quantitative methods (Bryce et al. 2016, Schulz and Martin-Ortega 2018, Huynh et al. 2022), qualitative, participatory, and mixed methods approaches, as well as the employment of sociocultural indicators, more fully capture their meaning.
At the same time, identifying specific articulation of value coming together in fuzzy boundaries can help identify lines of conflicts and take into account diverse knowledge and value systems. Although, for example, significant alliances across stakeholders might be constructed around the idea of life-support values, leaving space for diverse articulations of why and how they matter to different social groups in their own terms may point to underlying reasons for contention. For example, in the US Pacific Northwest, salmon are keystone species for ecologists and environmentalists, and they are foundational for the collective identity and the material and spiritual existence of many local tribes, facilitating alliances to restore waterways and protect salmon from imminent extinction (Salmon Orca Project 2023). With these benefits in mind, the diverse expressions of the importance of salmon are brought into fruitful coexistence toward common goals such as dam removal, but, because they are not conflated, they may also illuminate areas of contention that could undermine collaboration, such as the role of fish hatcheries (Fox et al. 2022) or the prioritization of tribal fishing rights. When considered in this way, research on life-support values can offer a potential common ground for encounters across different epistemic traditions and knowledge systems, within and beyond academia, in which diverse articulations can coexist and in which cross-fertilization is possible (Tengö et al. 2014).
Systematic literature searches are limited by the databases and search string used to identify articles. Accordingly, the present article reflects a limited set of knowledge that neglects oral traditions, gray literature, and other forms of nonacademic knowledge. In addition, some key publications on relational values (Muraca 2011, Díaz et al. 2015, Chan et al. 2016) did not appear because the combination of value types and nature, ecosystem services, or nature's contributions to people did not occur in the title, abstract, keywords, or subject, even though they occurred in the text. For this reason, expert knowledge and consideration of additional sources was essential to contextualize, integrate, and interpret the results. Overall, the 239 coded papers augmented by the present authors’ knowledge of the literature are comprehensive of the current leading debates on specific environmental values.
For instance, some important contributions from ILK and non-English literature include broader conceptualizations of instrumental values not limited to Western worldviews or reducible to means to human ends, as is described in our core meaning. These uses of instrumental values also extend to diverse worldviews, including pluricentrism, which were not relevant associations of instrumental values identified in our assessment of the literature (IPBES 2022). In these cases, the language of instrumental values can help articulate the importance for IPLC of access to and use of necessities such as wild food plants and animals (Ghorbani et al. 2012) but also the need for protection from them, as with the protection of crops from elephants in the Congo Basin (Ngouhouo Poufoun et al. 2016).
Similarly, for the semantic field of relational values, other examples emerged from a parallel search on ILK literature that were not immediately apparent from the coded literature. One reason is that in the case of relational ontologies or cosmovisions (Acuña et al. 2015, Escobar 2018, Diver et al. 2019), relational values are rarely articulated in the definitory language of specific values (as values of relationships between people and nature and among people through nature), although they also encompass and inform specific values with respect to contextual NCP and place-specific relations. In many cases, relational language is expressed with reference to general norms or instructions that guide practices (e.g., gathering, hunting, growing, ceremonies) and regulate use and access or principles that organize ways of life, modes of cohabitation with other-than-humans, obligations, and reciprocity (Singh 2013, Rahder 2014, Gould et al. 2019, Solís and Casas 2019). For example, the Cuicatec people in Mexico have rules associated with hunting and gathering seasons that respect female individuals of vertebrate species (Solís and Casas 2019). Similarly, the Monpa in Arunachal Pradesh, India, have environmental management practices emphasizing respectful land use influenced by traditional knowledge and the cultural network among community members (Singh 2013).
We believe that having a clear understanding of the different value types and the ways they are used in the literature advances the potential for pluralistic valuation of ecosystem services and NCP and can inform better policy decisions. There is large consensus in the literature we reviewed that considering diverse values can help policymakers by making otherwise neglected, intangible costs and benefits visible (Witt et al. 2019), facilitate a more inclusive and just articulation of values (Himes and Muraca 2018), mitigate conflicts by fostering comanagement (Kenter et al. 2015, García-Llorente et al. 2018), and encourage participation and improve communication among different groups (Hope and Jones 2014, Reed and Ceno 2015, Arias-Arévalo et al. 2017, Berry et al. 2018, Gale and Ednie 2019, Witt et al. 2019). It can strengthen the motivations of people toward conservation (Winkler and Hauck 2019), enable better collaboration across disciplines (Chan et al. 2018), and support broad alliances for win–win solutions (Reyers et al. 2012). Pluralistic value assessments also reduce the risk of crowding out other motivations and help build common ground and reciprocal learning across different stakeholders by acknowledging different motivations (Rico García-Amado et al. 2013).
However, for theoretical consistency and accuracy in policy use, it is important to clarify the terminology regarding the different values at play in pluralistic assessments. Simultaneously, the fuzzy boundaries between values can indicate convergences that may be useful to build common ground across different groups in support of biodiversity conservation or equitable development (Norton 1991, Berry et al. 2018): “Environmentalists may consistently disagree over the reasons for a specific policy direction without disagreeing over the policy direction itself” (Saner and Bordt 2016, p. 76).

Sections

"[{\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib4\", \"bib76a\", \"bib27\", \"bib71\", \"bib85\", \"bib92\", \"bib180\", \"bib76a\", \"bib31\", \"bib76a\", \"bib125\", \"bib169\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"The ways individuals, communities, and societies express, embody, or articulate the importance of nature and people\\u2013nature relationships take many forms. This diversity has important implications for research, policy, and valuation around nature and nature's contributions to people (NCP), including ecosystem services (Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022, IPBES 2022). Recent publications emphasize the need to focus on the multiple and diverse values of nature to achieve socially equitable and environmentally sustainable outcomes (Chan et\\u00a0al. 2016, Himes and Muraca 2018, Kenter et\\u00a0al. 2019, K\\u00f6hler et\\u00a0al. 2019, Zafra-Calvo et\\u00a0al. 2020, IPBES 2022). Simultaneously, numerous international bodies have recognized this need. In this vein, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) commissioned and approved the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature (hereafter, the values assessment), in which the organization found that policy decisions have been largely based on a narrow set of market values of nature, underpinning the global biodiversity crisis. The values assessment concludes that identifying multiple values and incorporating them into policymaking provides leverage points for transformative change toward more just and sustainable futures, in line with Agenda 2030, the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, and other multilateral agreements (CBD 2022, IPBES 2022, Pascual et al. 2023, United Nations 2023).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib76a\", \"bib134\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"The values assessment proposes a typology to synthesize ways of conceptualizing the values of nature across diverse disciplines and knowledge systems (IPBES 2022). Accordingly, nature's values may be organized on the basis of four interrelated dimensions: worldviews and knowledge systems (ontologies and ways individuals or groups interpret, inhabit, and modify the world around them), broad values (life goals and guiding principles), specific values (opinions and judgments about the importance and meaning of something in specific contexts), and value indicators (the quantitative measures or qualitative descriptions of importance given to specific values; Raymond et\\u00a0al. 2023).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib76a\", \"bib40\", \"bib27\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"In the present article, we focus on the dimension of specific values, using the most common classification found in the academic literature: intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values (IPBES 2022). Within the wider values typology, specific values reflect how people, communities, and societies justify why and how nature and people\\u2013nature relationships are important to them. They represent historical contributions from, inter alia, environmental education, environmental ethics, conservation biology, and ecosystem services literatures. Researchers in these disciplines have sought to address the value of nature for its own sake, nature's benefit to people, and the value of noninstrumental and meaningful people\\u2013nature relationships (D\\u00edaz et\\u00a0al. 2015, Chan et\\u00a0al. 2016).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib4\", \"bib113\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"As part of the values assessment, we conducted a systematic literature review of these three specific value types to identify core meanings, trends, themes, disciplinary discrepancies, areas of convergence, and policy implications (see Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022). Following the IPBES methods guidelines, the review process was documented and made publicly available in an annex to the values assessment (Muraca and Gould 2022), and its results are presented and discussed in the present article to (1) identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts in the wider typology of values developed in the values assessment; (2) to determine a core meaning for each value type that is inclusive enough to serve as an umbrella over different uses in the literature and specific enough to help highlight its difference from the other types of values; and (3) to discuss convergences, overlapping areas, and fuzzy boundaries between different value types to facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings, and improve methods for pluralistic valuation of NCP (including ecosystem services), inform policy, and direct future research.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig1\", \"bib44\", \"bib100\", \"bib108\", \"bib113\"], \"section\": \"Surveying the literature\", \"text\": \"The literature review encompassed a systematized search, a qualitative analysis based on interpretive coding, and critical interpretive synthesis (figure\\u00a01; Dixon-Woods et\\u00a0al. 2006, Macura et\\u00a0al. 2019). The publicly available protocol guarantees the traceability and repeatability of the search process by documenting the search strings, the selection (inclusions and exclusions) criteria, and the interpretative codes used by all reviewers. We chose four academic databases (Web of Science, EBSCOhost Academic Search Premier, Google Scholar, and SCOPUS) to guarantee a wide spectrum of sources and to mitigate known disciplinary biases (Mongeon and Paul-Hus 2016). The searches were conducted in English in April 2020, with no limits on publication dates. The search terms in titles, keywords, abstracts, or subjects were adjusted according to the particular database structure and were focused on combinations of value terms (intrinsic value, instrumental value, relational value) with nature-related terms (ecosystem services, nature's contributions to people, or nature; see Muraca and Gould 2022 for details).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib113\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"The process and workflow of systematic literature review for intrinsic, instrumental, and relational specific values. For further information and data management report, see Muraca and Gould (2022).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib113\"], \"section\": \"Surveying the literature\", \"text\": \"After these eliminations, we coded 239 articles. The reviewers analyzed the literature on the basis of a shared codebook with categories relevant to the values assessment (see Muraca and Gould 2022). The coding was carried out as a form of qualitative content analysis; the majority of the codes entailed descriptive content as opposed to a predefined typology or data range.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib76a\"], \"section\": \"Surveying the literature\", \"text\": \"For the interpretive critical analysis, the following five codes were analyzed: general information (the location of the study, the location of the first author's institution, and if the paper was an empirical work, a review, or a perspective); the worldviews directly or indirectly addressed (biocentric or ecocentric, strong anthropocentric, weak anthropocentric, pluricentric, or other, according to the IPBES values assessment; IPBES 2022); the ways in which people\\u2013nature relationships were otherwise expressed (e.g., connection to nature, human\\u2013nature relatedness, biocultural diversity, sacred landscapes); whether and which value types were explicitly or implicitly addressed (i.e., intrinsic, instrumental, relational) and how the value types were defined (verbatim quotes) or indirectly described or intended (verbatim quotes or paraphrase); and policy relevance (the impact on policy of multiple value types, including value pluralism).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib4\"], \"section\": \"Surveying the literature\", \"text\": \"Finally, we assess patterns of relevant associations between the three specific value types and worldviews most frequently related to people\\u2013nature relationships as identified within the values assessment (i.e., anthropocentric, bio- or ecocentric, and pluricentric; Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022). Relevant associations were noted when the reviewer interpreted that the paper aligned with a particular worldview and included explicit references to worldviews in quotes or by paraphrasing implicit references.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib7\"], \"section\": \"Surveying the literature\", \"text\": \"We also realized that papers rooted in Indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) approaches were poorly represented in our data set. We collaborated with other experts within the values assessment, who had completed a parallel literature review on ILK, and invited them to complement the results of the interpretive synthesis by analyzing implicit expressions of the three value types in their data and offering correctives, comments, and examples (Athayde 2022).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib51\", \"bib106\", \"bib40\", \"bib40\", \"bib27\", \"bib111\", \"fig2\", \"bib46\", \"bib172\"], \"section\": \"By the numbers\", \"text\": \"Since the first identified reference in 1985 in the searched databases (F\\u00f8rsund 1985), the number of publications on intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values has increased steadily over time. There is a marked increase in literature related to specific values in the early 2000s, coinciding with the work of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the publication of the initial Ecosystems and Human Well-Being report (MEA 2005). Another period of growth in the 2010s corresponds to the publication of The Economics of Ecosystem and Biodiversity (TEEB) in 2010 and the initiation of IPBES (established in 2012, conceptual framework published in 2015; D\\u0131az et\\u00a0al. 2015). Although intrinsic and instrumental values were present in the literature across the whole period, the first explicit mention of relational values occurred in 2016, after the introduction of the IPBES conceptual framework (D\\u00edaz et\\u00a0al. 2015) and the foundational paper by Chan and colleagues (2016), which popularized the term and drew on the concept as presented in Muraca (2011), but these three papers were not recovered using our search criteria (see the \\u201cStudy limitations\\u201d section). However, earlier papers implicitly evoked the concept of relational values. Intrinsic and instrumental values are most prevalent in early years; then the number of relational values publications catches up, contributing substantially to the overall increase in publications on the specific values of nature (figure\\u00a02). It should be noted that the use of relational categories to understand society\\u2013 or community\\u2013nature relationships significantly predates the introduction of the term relational values, especially in sociology and anthropology (Emirbayer 1997, Viveiros De Castro 2004).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib106\", \"bib165\", \"bib40\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"The annual number of publications from 1985 to 2019 that focus on specific values of nature. The callouts indicate pivotal framework publications, posited to affect research on the values of nature, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005), The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB 2010), and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services\\u2019 conceptual framework (D\\u00edaz et\\u00a0al. 2015). Many of the papers referred to more than one value type, so the cumulative number of publications (the dashed line) is less than the sum of each specific value (the columns).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig3\"], \"section\": \"By the numbers\", \"text\": \"The publications came from first (lead) authors with affiliations in 40 different countries. The largest number were from the United States (63), followed by the United Kingdom (29), Australia (22), the Netherlands (16), Canada (16), and Sweden (12), with other countries represented by fewer than 10 publications (figure\\u00a03).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig4\"], \"section\": \"By the numbers\", \"text\": \"The papers were classified as perspectives, including theoretical, conceptual, philosophical, and editorial pieces (46%); empirical studies (40%); and review articles (13%). Most of the papers referred to intrinsic (77%) or instrumental (67%) values. The publications focusing on relational values accounted for 34% of the reviewed papers. Although intrinsic and instrumental values had similar proportions of empirical (37% and 40%, respectively), perspective (51% and 48%, respectively), and review publications (11% and 12%, respectively), the relational values literature had a comparatively larger percentage of empirical (44%) and review (21%) articles with a corresponding lower percentage of perspectives (35%; figure\\u00a04).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"tbl1\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Table\\u00a01 summarizes the most relevant results from the qualitative analysis and interpretive critical synthesis, which classified each value type according to its core meaning, salient articulations, and relevant associations with worldviews and other concepts. Identifying a sufficiently distinct core meaning on the basis of relevant salient articulations for each value type on the ground of a review of interdisciplinary literature helps define each semantic field more clearly. It is also helpful for identifying categories and codes in valuations studies and empirical research and as reference basis for comparability across studies.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib76a\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"With respect to the relevant associations with worldviews, we generally followed the categorization of worldviews articulated in the values assessment values typology (IPBES 2022). Accordingly, biocentric and ecocentric worldviews were considered together, despite their differentiation in environmental ethics, because they share a nonanthropocentric perspective and can both be considered nature centered. Anthropocentrism is presented on a spectrum between weak or relational (recognizing human dependence on other beings) and strong or narrow (human superiority over other species) anthropocentrism. Pluricentric worldviews focus on a web of reciprocal and systemic relationships between human and other-than-human beings.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib120\", \"bib121\", \"bib124\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"The term intrinsic value with reference to other-than-human beings is used in the literature with different, sometimes confused, meanings (O'Neill 1992, 1993). Intrinsic values are characterized as opposite to instrumental values, as the value of something that is an end in itself, as values independent of human judgment, as independent of human interests or well-being, and as the inherent moral value (in the sense of being a holder of rights) of other-than-human beings. In the IPBES conceptual framework, intrinsic values are equated to nonanthropocentric values and defined as the value of an entity independent of how it relates to humans (Pascual et\\u00a0al. 2017). In this section, we do not engage with theoretical discussions of appropriate or inappropriate uses and definitions but summarize and analyze the findings from the literature review.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib145\", \"bib71\", \"bib142\", \"bib147\", \"bib15\", \"bib88\", \"bib11\", \"bib129\", \"bib24\", \"bib118\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Considering these differences and variations of use, we propose the following definition as an operational core meaning of intrinsic value: \\u201cvalues of other-than-human beings expressed independently of any reference to humans as valuers, including values associated with entities worth protecting as ends in and of themselves.\\u201d This definition serves as an umbrella meaning for most salient articulations by focusing on the justification behind them. Accordingly, expressing that other-than-human beings have intrinsic value does not necessarily mean that they have no relation to people (Sagoff 2009) but that the reason they are valued is explicitly expressed regardless of that relationship (Himes and Muraca 2018). This can include recognizing that nonhuman beings have their own interests and needs that warrant consideration (Rolston 1993, Sandler 2010, Berry et\\u00a0al. 2018). The definition is consistent with biocentric worldviews (King 2006, Batavia and Nelson 2017, Piccolo 2017) and aims at bridging subjective (people attributing intrinsic value to nature) and objective (value existing in nature regardless of people's attribution) understandings of value. To account for perspectives insisting on the objective nature of values, we added to the definition a reference to the understanding of intrinsic values as the value of entities that are worth protecting as ends in themselves. Framed this way, intrinsic values are not only assessed through biophysical indicators, such as abundance and endemism, but can also be subjectively articulated by people (Callicott 2002), who might act on them and acknowledge consequences to or rights for other-than-human nature (O'Connor and Kenter 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"tbl1\", \"bib174\", \"bib54\", \"bib173\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"We identified five salient articulations of intrinsic value (table\\u00a01). The first defines intrinsic values negatively as noninstrumental values (e.g., Weesie and van Andel 2008, F\\u00fcrst 2015, Vucetich et\\u00a0al. 2015). This salient articulation is straightforward and often implicitly presupposed in literature on intrinsic values, but the negative definition has limited usefulness by itself unless a strict dualism between intrinsic and instrumental values is assumed.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib98\", \"bib139\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"The next salient articulation defines intrinsic values as the value of something that is an end in itself or has agency. Within this articulation, we include descriptions of nonhuman nature being valuable for its own sake (e.g., Lockwood 1999, Reyers et\\u00a0al. 2012).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib42\", \"bib74\", \"bib55\", \"bib156a\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Furthermore, intrinsic value is described as independent of being valued or recognized by a (human) valuer (e.g., Dion 2000, Hovardas 2013, Gale and Ednie 2019). This includes reference to inherent properties of an entity and to the objective value of nonhuman nature that exists regardless of human preferences, attitudes, or even their existence (Sheng et\\u00a0al. 2019). In the literature, this articulation is often presented in terms of nonanthropocentric values.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib58\", \"bib38\", \"bib75\", \"bib171\", \"bib164\", \"bib153\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Intrinsic value is also articulated as the value of nonhuman nature regardless of its usefulness to humans or human well-being (e.g., Ghilarov 2000, Devos et\\u00a0al. 2019, Hug\\u00e9 et\\u00a0al. 2020). This understanding includes what is commonly known as subjective intrinsic values, which refers to values attributed by people to something that is valuable for its own sake to them and not for its usefulness; this category often includes aesthetic values (van Koppen 2000, Swift et\\u00a0al. 2004, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2014).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib3\", \"bib48\", \"bib149\", \"bib137\", \"bib142\", \"bib11\", \"bib154\", \"bib127\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Intrinsic value is used to address the inherent moral value of other-than-human beings, including arguments for nonhuman nature's rights to exist and other rights-based justifications (e.g., Alho 2008, Falk-Andersson et\\u00a0al. 2015, Sarkki et\\u00a0al. 2019). It resonates with biocentric conservation and some animal rights literature (Regan 1992, Rolston 1993, Batavia and Nelson 2017), which often imply moral obligations toward other-than-human entities (Schuler et\\u00a0al. 2017), and sometimes with the language of existence value intended as the right to exist regardless of function (Pearson 2016).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib83\", \"bib52\", \"bib88\", \"bib60\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Intrinsic values are strongly and often explicitly associated with nonanthropocentric worldviews (Kahn 1997, Freemuth 2001, King 2006, Gilbert et\\u00a0al. 2009). This is not surprising, because most of the salient articulations of intrinsic value focus on the value of nature as independent or separate from humans or insist on the stand-alone value of other-than-human life.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib69\", \"bib63\", \"bib119\", \"bib70\", \"bib103\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Intrinsic values also tend to be associated with broad values that emphasize moral obligations toward nonhuman nature, other living things, or life in general (e.g., Harrop 2013, Gray and Curry 2016, \\u00d6hman et\\u00a0al. 2016), whether it be animals, species, all living beings, or ecosystems. Less commonly, intrinsic values were associated with sacred values, other-regarding, or biospheric broad values (Hattingh 2014, May 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib20\", \"bib27\", \"bib96\", \"bib75\", \"bib81\", \"bib152\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"We propose an operational core meaning of instrumental value as \\u201cvalues of other-than-human entities, as means to achieve human ends or satisfy human preferences.\\u201d This core meaning includes \\u201ceconomic values, regardless of whether the entity is directly or indirectly used or not used\\u201d (Brondizio et\\u00a0al. 2019, p.\\u00a022). Accordingly, natural entities are important not in themselves but insofar as they provide (potential) utility to humans (Chan et\\u00a0al. 2016) or support communities\\u2019 economic well-being or subsistence (Lau et\\u00a0al. 2019, Hug\\u00e9 et\\u00a0al. 2020). This is expressed in many second-generation constitutions (i.e., constitutions that refer to social rights; Jung et\\u00a0al. 2014), which recognize people's right to a clean environment. Because instrumental values refers to a means to an end, the means might be substitutable (Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020), at least in principle, even if not always in practice: That is, it is acceptable to consider equivalents or substitutes, if any are available or possible, that can provide similar benefits.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib98\", \"bib139\", \"bib77\", \"bib129\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"We identified three salient articulations, often overlapping, of instrumental values. The first refers to the value of other-than-human nature as means to an end (e.g., Lockwood 1999, Reyers et\\u00a0al. 2012, James 2020). In most cases, the end is intended as usefulness, utility, or benefits, for humans, although some scholars also stress the instrumental value of something as a means for ends set by other-than-human beings (Piccolo 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib119\", \"bib80\", \"bib55\", \"bib165\", \"bib70\", \"bib50\", \"bib30\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"The second refers to the satisfaction of needs, preferences, interests, or desires (e.g., \\u00d6hman et\\u00a0al. 2016, Jones and Tobin 2018, Gale and Ednie 2019). The papers using this salient articulation sometimes refer to nonuse benefits of nature, usually referencing the total economic value (TEV) classification (TEEB 2010), including altruistic, bequest, or existence value types (Hattingh 2014, Farrell et\\u00a0al. 2017, Christie et\\u00a0al. 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib13\", \"bib17\", \"bib14\", \"bib10\", \"bib15\", \"bib165\", \"bib34\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"The last salient articulation refers to nature's value as a resource for the delivery of ecosystem services, as an asset, capital, or property (e.g., Beltrani 1997, Bonnett 2012, BenDor et\\u00a0al. 2014, Batavia et\\u00a0al. 2018, Berry et\\u00a0al. 2018). This includes reference to the importance of sustainable use and environmental policy to maintain or enhance natural capital. Currently, this understanding is best articulated in TEEB (2010) and by the recent Dasgupta review, in which nature is defined as an asset (Dasgupta 2021).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib83\", \"bib139\", \"bib74\", \"bib178\", \"bib128\", \"bib19\", \"bib3\", \"bib48\", \"bib50\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Instrumental values are strongly and explicitly associated with ecosystem services and anthropocentric worldviews (Kahn 1997, Reyers et\\u00a0al. 2012, Hovardas 2013). In almost all cases, the ends of instrumental values and the beneficiary of nature's resources or services was human (e.g., Winter and Lockwood 2004, Pelenc et\\u00a0al. 2013, Bremer et\\u00a0al. 2018). Instrumental values also tended to be strongly and explicitly associated with utilitarianism and paradigms of managing nature (Alho 2008, Falk-Andersson et\\u00a0al. 2015, Farrell et\\u00a0al. 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib117a\", \"bib77a\", \"bib98a\", \"bib129a\", \"bib161\", \"bib78\", \"bib6\", \"bib90\", \"bib26\", \"bib71\", \"bib122\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Given the more recent history of the use of relational values as a specific value in environmental literature, different meanings and uses of the term coexist. There is ongoing debate whether they are a separate type of value (Norton and Sanbeg 2021, James 2022, Luque-Lora 2023, Piccolo et\\u00a0al. 2022) or whether they should be considered as a boundary object (St\\u00e5lhammar and Thor\\u00e9n 2019). We do not engage in the debate in the present article, but rather focus on how relational values are presented in the reviewed literature. The term is often used in the literature to express the value of noninstrumental human\\u2013nature relationships or emphasize relationships that are, in principle, not substitutable and lose their meaning if translated into narrowly instrumental language (Jax et\\u00a0al. 2013, Arias-Ar\\u00e9valo et\\u00a0al. 2017, Klain et\\u00a0al. 2017, Chan et\\u00a0al. 2018, Himes and Muraca 2018), as in the case of friendship, which is important precisely because of the relationship but loses its meaning if reduced to a means to an end (O'Neill et\\u00a0al. 2008). The language of intrinsic values is generally not helpful to articulate relational values, because most framings of intrinsic values explicitly disregard relationships in the justification of importance.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib27\", \"bib26\", \"bib37\", \"bib71\", \"bib152\", \"bib85\", \"bib104\", \"bib87\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"We propose the core meaning of relational values as the \\u201cvalues of meaningful, and often reciprocal human relationships\\u2014beyond means to an end\\u2014with nature and among people through nature, where nature is often specified as a particular landscape, place, species, forest, etc.\\u201d (Chan et\\u00a0al. 2016, Chan et\\u00a0al. 2018, De Vos et\\u00a0al. 2018, Himes and Muraca 2018, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020). Relational values are frequently framed as context dependent, often place-based, nontradable, and therefore largely not substitutable in principle (Kenter et\\u00a0al. 2019). They refer to complex human\\u2013nature relationships that are integral to a good quality of life and are important for how some people understand themselves as living in and through reciprocal relationships of responsibility in the bioculturally diverse world they inhabit (McGregor 2010, Kimmerer 2011).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib27\", \"bib152\", \"bib27\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"First, close to the core meaning, as it was used more or less explicitly in the majority of the analyzed papers, relational values are intended as the values of or deriving from desirable, meaningful, just, and reciprocal relationships of people with nature and among people through nature (Chan et\\u00a0al. 2016, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020). The term often overlaps with other salient articulations that emphasize more specific types of relationships and is frequently evoked by citing the foundational Chan and colleagues (2016) paper or the IPBES framework's definition of relational values.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib114\", \"bib37\", \"bib62\", \"bib163a\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Second, relational values refers to values relative to or deriving from relationships that are constituent parts of people's identity (cultural, individual or collective; Musschenga 2004, De Vos et\\u00a0al. 2018, Gould et\\u00a0al. 2019). This articulation is helpful in expressing the value of people\\u2013nature relationships for indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLC). For example, in the New Zealand agreement between the Indigenous Whanganui Iwi (M\\u0101ori) people and the Crown, the river Te Awa Tupua is acknowledged as connected with the identity of the iwi and hap\\u016b in an inalienable way, because the document literally says, \\u201cI am the River and the river is me\\u201d (Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib90\", \"bib79\", \"bib152\", \"bib91\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Third, relational values refers to values relative to or deriving from relationships that are constituent elements for living a good life. This includes relationships with people and nature that are essential components of a meaningful and flourishing life (eudaimonia), worthy of a human being, including virtues and attitudes of responsibility (Klain et\\u00a0al. 2017, Jax et\\u00a0al. 2018, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020). For instance, Knippenberg and colleagues (2018, p. 43) insisted that \\u201cgood relations are key constituents of the good life\\u201d and propose the concept of nature-inclusive eudaimonia, in which nature is considered constitutive of human flourishing.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib37\", \"bib101\", \"bib159\", \"bib9\", \"bib79\", \"bib92\", \"bib149\", \"bib37\", \"bib110\", \"bib23\", \"bib103\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Fourth, relational values are associated with sense of place (De Vos et\\u00a0al. 2018, Marshall et\\u00a0al. 2019, Skubel et\\u00a0al. 2019, Basu et\\u00a0al. 2020) and interconnected with cultural and sacred landscapes (e.g., Jax et\\u00a0al. 2018, K\\u00f6hler et\\u00a0al. 2019, Sarkki et\\u00a0al. 2019). Examples include plural valuations of nature in protected areas (e.g., De Vos et\\u00a0al. 2018, Mrotek et\\u00a0al. 2019), values that motivate preservation of a specific landscape such as the sense of pride reported by Calcagni and colleagues (2019) by citizens of Chattanooga that builds connections between people and their city through a unique sense of place and culture. This articulation also includes landscapes that are sacred or have spiritual meaning such as wakas, or sacred sanctuaries, of Andean peoples, which are places for connection and renewal (May 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib61\", \"bib79\", \"bib39\", \"bib103\", \"bib116\", \"bib103\", \"bib62\", \"bib116\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Fifth, values associated with care for or about specific landscapes, places, human and nonhuman others, including values of responsibility and reciprocity (Gould et\\u00a0al. 2018, Jax et\\u00a0al. 2018, De Vreese et\\u00a0al. 2019), such as reciprocal responsibilities of giving and receiving between people and the natural world (May 2017, Norgaard et\\u00a0al. 2017). For example, in South America's Quechua language, reciprocity, or ayni, is the glue that holds everything together (May 2017), and in Hawaii, e m\\u0101lama i ka \\u2019aina means \\u201ctake care of the land\\u201d (Gould et\\u00a0al. 2019). In northern California, for Karuk fishers, the \\u201cresponsibilities to the natural world include ceremonial management of the fishery to ensure \\u2018escapement\\u2019 and burning of the forest to enhance runoff\\u201d (Norgaard et\\u00a0al. 2017, p. 103).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib116\", \"bib57\", \"bib159\", \"bib124\", \"bib159\", \"bib45\", \"bib28\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"The final salient articulation of relational values refers to values of nature as a point of connection among people, binding communities together and supporting social networks (e.g., Norgaard et\\u00a0al. 2017, Garc\\u00eda-Llorente et\\u00a0al. 2018, Skubel et\\u00a0al. 2019). Many papers that fit this salient articulation reference Pascual and colleagues\\u2019 (2017, p. 12) assertion that \\u201crelational values reflect elements of\\u2026 social cohesion,\\u201d but common and more detailed accounts are found in ILK literature; for example, Skubel and colleagues (2019) described how the Rrumburryia clan of the Yanyuwa people in northern Australia tell a story of \\u201cThe Tiger Shark (Ngurdrungurdu) Dreaming,\\u201d which exemplifies how sharks are part of what binds humans and other-than-human nature together, or the agdal system, a traditional Berber form of environmental management in North Africa in which reciprocal relationships with the natural world are essential for supporting community cohesion, cultural coherence, and social networks (Dominguez et\\u00a0al. 2012). This articulation is also evident in intergenerational connections made through relationships to farming a place and farming as a way of life identified in interview responses of farmers in the US Northwest (Chapman et\\u00a0al. 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib103\", \"bib150\", \"bib38\", \"bib62\", \"bib65\", \"bib39\", \"bib69\", \"bib72\", \"bib92\"], \"section\": \"Intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values: Core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"Relational values are very strongly associated with pluricentric worldviews, which question the strict separation between nature and culture, society, or humanity and stress the interdependence between all beings (May 2017, Saxena et\\u00a0al. 2018, Devos et\\u00a0al. 2019, Gould et\\u00a0al. 2019). They are also very strongly associated with broad values of stewardship, responsibility, care, affection, reciprocity, harmony with nature, good life, and justice (Gudynas and Acosta 2011, De Vreese et\\u00a0al. 2019). Finally, relational values are also associated with cultural ecosystem services and spirituality (e.g., Harrop 2013, Hofstra 2017, K\\u00f6hler et\\u00a0al. 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib124\", \"bib71\", \"bib152\", \"bib151\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"We found, in some contexts, that the meanings of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values are contested and may overlap (Pascual et\\u00a0al. 2017, Himes and Muraca 2018, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020), creating fuzzy boundaries. For instance, we found\\u2014not surprisingly\\u2014overlapping meanings between relational and instrumental values with respect to material NCP such as food, which may have instrumental and relational value, depending on the context and local practices. For example, in Mahahe, wild fruit groves are appreciated instrumentally, for the important additions to the diet and the shade they offer, as well as relationally, as a gathering place for communing with each other and nature (Schnegg et\\u00a0al. 2014). These wild fruit groves simultaneously have instrumental and relational values to the Mahahe. Identifying fuzzy boundaries helps articulate the full measure of their importance to the community, which can otherwise not be adequately expressed by a single value type. At the same time, being able to analytically distinguish between instrumental and relational value articulations can help identify or monitor shifts in how the community understands their relationships with the trees or differentiate value articulations by age or economic status.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib142\", \"bib88\", \"bib69\", \"bib38\", \"bib159\", \"bib64\", \"bib17\", \"bib144\", \"bib16\", \"bib135\", \"bib175\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"Justifications based on instrumental and intrinsic values often overlap when sentient animals are seen as ends in themselves and reducing their suffering could be justified under a utilitarian framework as instrumentally good for them (Rolston 1993, King 2006, Harrop 2013). In other instances, relational and subjective intrinsic value (something is important for someone for its own sake) or intrinsic value defined negatively as noninstrumental might be hard to distinguish. In other cases, fuzzy boundaries extend to all three value types, as with the sense of place. In many cases, relational values are equated with values of specific places (Devos et\\u00a0al. 2019) or a sense of place (Skubel et\\u00a0al. 2019); in other cases, intrinsic (Gruen 2002, Bonnett 2012), instrumental (Runhaar et\\u00a0al. 2019), or both types of values (Blennow et\\u00a0al. 2019) are attributed to the importance of place. The literature suggests that values can be socially or symbolically constructed through relationships with others in places (relational values), the sense of place can also be associated with the material properties of places (instrumental meanings) or the intangible emotional, symbolic, and spiritual meanings of places (expressed as relational or subjective intrinsic values; Raymond et\\u00a0al. 2010, Williams 2014).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig5\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"In the remainder of this section, we discuss in more detail three fuzzy boundaries that we identified repeatedly where all three value types converged: nonuse values, aesthetic values, and values linked to life support processes, which we term life-support values (figure\\u00a05). We draw occasionally on additional literature from the value assessment besides the data collected for the systematic literature search in order to clarify concepts, introduce general themes, or support explanations with additional, relevant examples. Although the evidence of overlapping use of different value types was evident in the literature, indicating the existence of these fuzzy boundaries, the discussion of reasons for the fuzzy boundaries and potential significance for policy, practice, and decision-making results from the author's interpretation of the findings.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib124\", \"bib178\", \"bib66\", \"bib164\", \"bib22\", \"bib181\", \"bib109\", \"bib127\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"The term nonuse values originated in the economic literature and is distinguished from use values, as in the TEV framework. Use values refers to the satisfaction generated by the direct (consumptive or nonconsumptive) or indirect (the conditions that enable use or satisfaction) use of ecosystem services or NCP. Nonuse values \\u201care based on the preference for components of nature's existence without the valuer using or experiencing it and are of three types: existence value, altruistic value, and bequest value\\u201d (Pascual et\\u00a0al. 2017, pp. 11\\u201312). Besides this specific economic meaning, the term nonuse values is employed to articulate some instrumental values that cannot be represented straightforwardly in monetary terms or via market exchanges\\u2014for example, the rights of future generations to biodiversity or nature components (Winter and Lockwood 2004, Haggan 2011). Nonuse values are also sometimes evoked to express intrinsic values generally (Swift et\\u00a0al. 2004) or as synonymous with existence value (Buijs 2009, Zhang et\\u00a0al. 2013), and we identified implicit references to relational values in descriptions of nonuse values\\u2014for example, with reference to altruistic values (More et\\u00a0al. 1996, Pearson 2016).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib84\", \"bib102\", \"bib4\", \"bib166\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"From a theoretical point of view, interpreting existence value or altruistic value in terms of intrinsic or relational justifications results from a misinterpretation of the economic language (Kenter et\\u00a0al. 2015). Framing intrinsic and relational values in terms of TEV nonuse values might have consequences in terms of environmental and epistemic justice or might fail to adequately represent the complexity of environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier 2002), leading to inadequate policies to address them (Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022). For example, people generally perceive intrinsic values and many relational values as nonnegotiable and reject their reduction to the language of preferences, leading to environmental conflicts (Temper 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"box1\", \"fig6\", \"box1\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"However, the less specific uses that occur in the literature may help identify instances when multiple values are at play and highlight attempts at finding a common language across groups (see box 1). Moreover, nonuse values, within limitations, may serve as indicators for when intrinsic or relational values are present but likely cannot be used to assess the full meaning of those values without complimentary, noneconomic indicators (see figure\\u00a06 in box 1).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib67\", \"bib4\", \"bib165\", \"bib84\", \"bib4\", \"bib165\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"Total economic value (TEV) is based on a utilitarian, preference-based understanding of value that represents nonuse values in terms of the satisfaction generated for an individual by knowing that others will have access to nature's benefits, be it current (altruist value) or future generations (bequest value), or by knowing that something exists, even if there is no direct access to or direct enjoyment of it (existence value; Hansj\\u00fcrgens 2014, Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022). The focus on preferences is mostly anthropocentric and instrumental, where value is assigned to biodiversity or ecosystem services \\u201cto the extent that these fulfill needs or confer satisfaction to humans either directly or indirectly\\u201d (TEEB 2010, p. 187). This implies that existence, bequest, and altruistic values are represented according to an instrumental value justification that allows for trade-offs, commensurability, and potential substitutability across the objects of value (Kenter et\\u00a0al. 2015, Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022). As acknowledged by TEEB itself, nonuse values present \\u201cgreater challenges for valuation than do use values since nonuse values are related to moral, religious or aesthetic properties, for which markets usually do not exist\\u201d (TEEB 2010, p. 196).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib4\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"The total economic value classification framework encompasses multiple environmental value types. The figure presents a spectrum between stronger and weaker assumptions of substitutability between the objects of value. Source: The figure was adapted from the values assessment's chapter 2 (Anderson et\\u00a0al. 2022).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig5\", \"bib152\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"Although the TEV approach aims to capture instrumental values, other value types sometimes can be indirectly identified by framing them in the language of preferences (see figure\\u00a06). By borrowing language from Schr\\u00f6ter and colleagues (2020), who employ socioecological indicators as proxies for relational values, we propose, in a similar vein, to use, when legitimate and within limitations, TEV categories as indirect proxies that can help identify that a preference for a value is present but cannot estimate the strength of that preference compared to others, nor can they be accurately used to assess the full meaning of that value. In these cases, noneconomic indicators should be added to replace TEV to better address environmental conflicts, and to support epistemic and recognition justice.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib171\", \"bib164\", \"bib153\", \"bib101\", \"bib170\", \"bib177\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"Aesthetic values are also addressed under all three categories in the literature. In terms of intrinsic value, the beauty of nature, a place, or an other-than-human entity is considered valuable for its own sake regardless and independently of usefulness to people and it is nonnegotiable (van Koppen 2000, Swift et\\u00a0al. 2004, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2014, Marshall et\\u00a0al. 2019). In terms of instrumental value, beauty is conceived as a preference for a beautiful state of affairs over a different less beautiful state or because it causes aesthetic pleasure and can be expressed as willingness to pay or via hedonic valuation (the value of real estate in the vicinity of \\u2018beautiful\\u2019 green areas; van der Ploeg et\\u00a0al. 2011, Winter 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib111\", \"bib148\", \"bib152\", \"bib56\", \"bib36\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"In papers explicitly using the relational value concept, aesthetic values are defined as relational and noninstrumental; beauty is understood in terms of a relation to a specific place, landscape, ecosystem, or species that deeply informs the identity of an individual or community and their sense of belonging or willingness to care for that place (i.e., aesthetic experience is considered as an essential component of a good life; Muraca 2011, Saner and Bordt 2016, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020). Implicit references to relational values include, in our interpretation, the understanding of aesthetic appreciation as connected to sympathy toward and living in harmony with nature (Gao 2016). In this sense, articulating beauty only in terms preferences and trade-offs between them is firmly resisted, and the importance of the relation between valuer and valued object is highlighted (Deplazes-Zemp and Chapman 2021). Instead of considering this fuzzy boundary as a problem requiring a more precise or \\u201cright\\u201d articulation of aesthetic values, embracing the fuzziness can reinforce the importance of aesthetics and beauty as common ground across groups using different justifications. This common ground can be leveraged for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"fig7\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"The value of life-supporting processes, functions, and systems\\u2014interrelating biophysical, spiritual, or symbolic aspects\\u2014and relationships of dependence and interdependence with respect to them was also expressed in terms of all three value types. To account for these concepts found in the literature under the frame of intrinsic, instrumental, or relational values, we introduce the operational term life-support values (figure\\u00a07).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib142\", \"bib83\", \"bib128\", \"bib70\", \"bib53\", \"bib129\", \"bib141\", \"bib142\", \"bib58\", \"bib106\", \"bib49\", \"bib18\", \"bib143\", \"bib138\", \"bib157\", \"bib123\", \"bib99\", \"bib168\", \"bib163\"], \"section\": \"Fuzzy boundaries and overlapping meanings\", \"text\": \"Within the semantic field of each value type, life-support values are largely described as not substitutable and foundational for other environmental values. Under intrinsic values, life-support values are framed in the literature as the importance of evolutionary and ecological processes that are independent of people's judgments, including the Earth system as a whole (Rolston 1993, Kahn 1997, Pelenc et\\u00a0al. 2013, Hattingh 2014, Fritz-Vietta 2016, Piccolo 2017), which enable other values (Rolston 1988). Under instrumental values, life-support values are framed in terms of ecological functions or as the value of the biotic and abiotic prerequisites for the functional reliability and the self-organization of the ecological systems and apply to the importance of supporting ecosystem services (Rolston 1993, Ghilarov 2000, MEA 2005, Farnsworth et\\u00a0al. 2012, Bottazzi et\\u00a0al. 2018), indirect use values or primary values (Hansj\\u00fcrgens 2014, Fritz-Vietta 2016), functional values (Lockwood 1999), critical natural capital (Battistoni 2017), and regulating NCP (D\\u00edaz et\\u00a0al. 2015). Under relational values, life-support values are presented in terms of fundamental values (Muraca 2011, Arias-Ar\\u00e9valo et\\u00a0al. 2018, Schr\\u00f6ter et\\u00a0al. 2020) that express the importance of life-supporting processes that give sense to people's existence and identity. The latter is not limited to biophysical aspects but also includes the spiritual and symbolic meaning of life-giving and life-regenerating processes in specific contexts (e.g., contextual NCP), including, with reference to biophilia, \\u201cinnate and beneficial connections with nature\\u201d (Ross et\\u00a0al. 2018, p. 47) or in terms of lifeworlds (Reis Cunha 2017). Examples include the Andean Indigenous concept of Pachamama, referring to Earth's generative powers and to the very constitution of life (Silverblatt 1987, Pacari 2009, Macas 2010, Tola 2018) and the contextual spiritual foundations for the regeneration of life, practices, and reciprocal relations the Dongria people express for India's Niyamgiri Mountains, which \\u201cnot only provide the people with life and livelihoods, [but] they are also worshiped as the upholders of the Earth and the laws of the Universe\\u201d (Supreme Court of India 1995).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib106\", \"bib117\", \"bib82\", \"bib145\", \"bib11\", \"bib33\", \"bib165\"], \"section\": \"The three value types have distinct histories and associations that are clarified by core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"In earlier science\\u2013policy interface documents, such as the MEA, mainly intrinsic and instrumental values are presented and typically depicted in dichotomic opposition (something may either have dignity\\u2014intrinsic value\\u2014or a price\\u2014instrumental value; MEA 2005). This dichotomy is represented in the salient articulation of intrinsic values defined negatively as noninstrumental value but can be further mapped onto two predominant approaches in the general environmental discourse. For instance, the fields of conservation biology and environmental ethics both invoke salient articulations of intrinsic values as the value of natural processes and systems \\u201cregardless of importance or usefulness to humans\\u201d and \\u201cthe inherent moral value of natural beings (right to exist).\\u201d With the introduction of the CBD and the ecosystem services framework, instrumental (and relational) language has become more relevant in the debate (Norton 1991, Justus et\\u00a0al. 2009, Sagoff 2009, Batavia and Nelson 2017). In the sustainability discourse and in environmental and ecological economics, the language of instrumental value is increasingly dominant, primarily emphasizing the salient articulation of nature's value as a resource for ecosystem services, as an asset, capital, or property (Daily 1997, TEEB 2010).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib30\", \"bib39\", \"bib29\", \"bib111\", \"bib27\"], \"section\": \"The three value types have distinct histories and associations that are clarified by core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"However, despite being used in opposition, we found that the definitions of intrinsic and instrumental values sometimes overlap. Before the introduction of relational values to the environmental literature, many salient articulations of relational values would be designated confusingly as both intrinsic and instrumental. Since their introduction, relational values helped clarify the meaning and scope of environmental values in areas where instrumental and intrinsic value definitions overlapped, were inconsistent, or were not very clear, as is the case with identity-constituting relationships or social cohesion. Giving an explicit name to these values made them more visible and facilitated empirical research and assessments needed for policy (Christie et\\u00a0al. 2019, De Vreese et\\u00a0al. 2019, Chapman et\\u00a0al. 2020). The addition of relational values, to articulate the importance of noninstrumental relationships with nature and as a distinct value types (Muraca 2011, Chan et\\u00a0al. 2016), can mitigate confusing uses of intrinsic and instrumental values but only if scholars are willing to adopt it in their interpretation of literature predating the widespread use of the term relational values. This can be done more easily by keying in on salient articulations and relevant associations of relational values in earlier literature as indicators and evidence of implied relational values (e.g., values associated with spiritual meaning and the importance of caring and reciprocal relationships with nature). Recognizing relational values in earlier literature becomes more important as recent trends in the literature signal greater interest by empirical researchers to engage with them.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib97\"], \"section\": \"The three value types have distinct histories and associations that are clarified by core meanings, salient articulations, and relevant associations\", \"text\": \"The success of relational values in valuation studies might also have indirectly contributed to narrowing down the semantic domain of instrumental values. Although from a theoretical point of view this might be contentious, being able to distinguish instrumental and relational domains in practice can improve the implementation of environmental policy affecting diverse communities (Lliso et\\u00a0al. 2022).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib25\", \"bib134\"], \"section\": \"Implication of value pluralism guided by the core meanings and fuzzy boundaries for policy and valuation of NCP\", \"text\": \"Finding appropriate language to represent the diverse values of NCP and ecosystem services has important policy ramifications (Campagna et\\u00a0al. 2017). We believe that each value type provides a distinct and important mode of communicating and justifying the importance of nature and people\\u2013nature relationships. By isolating specific core meanings from the literature, the relevance and limitations of each value type for policy and valuation of ecosystem services and NCP can be more clearly identified and different trajectories of values enquiry clarified. Moreover, fuzzy boundaries between different value types, once they are identified, are logical areas to find or build common ground between parties with different conceptualizations of value or resource management interests (Raymond et\\u00a0al. 2023).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib130\", \"bib11\", \"bib181\", \"bib35\", \"bib107\", \"bib118\", \"bib28\"], \"section\": \"Implication of value pluralism guided by the core meanings and fuzzy boundaries for policy and valuation of NCP\", \"text\": \"Intrinsic values, as they are defined by the proposed core meaning in the present article, are considered, as we found in the reviewed literature, essential in environmental policy to sustain and trigger people's motivation for conservation (Polasky et\\u00a0al. 2012, Batavia and Nelson 2017), in education (Zhang et\\u00a0al. 2013), and to articulate the agency of other-than-human beings as expressed, for example, by Quechua communities in Peru about the mountain Ausangate as a powerful earth being (De La Cadena 2010). Intrinsic values are also closely associated with biocentric and ecocentric worldviews that continue to be important conceptualizations of nature in support of conservation. Appealing to intrinsic values can help legitimize environmental protections and improve policy success but may sometimes lack consideration of pragmatic elements relevant to environmental management (Minteer et\\u00a0al. 2004, O'Connor and Kenter 2019) or may disregard relational frameworks connecting people and land (Chapman et\\u00a0al. 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib94\", \"bib140\", \"bib39\", \"bib70\", \"bib110\"], \"section\": \"Implication of value pluralism guided by the core meanings and fuzzy boundaries for policy and valuation of NCP\", \"text\": \"Instrumental values, as they are defined according to the proposed core meaning in the present article, lend themselves, as we found in the literature, to quantitative analysis favored in valuation of ecosystem services and material NCP or resource management planning for sustainable development. Because they are substitutable in principle, they support high comparability and commensurability, which facilitates trade-off assessments that can be articulated in monetary units\\u2014for example, by adopting cost\\u2013benefit analysis or contingent valuation (Larr\\u00e9r\\u00e9 and Larr\\u00e9re 2007). However, narrowly instrumental approaches to valuation that only consider, for example, monetary values may obscure other value expressions, crowd out other reasons for environmental protection (Rico Garc\\u00eda-Amado et\\u00a0al. 2013), alienate stakeholders (De Vreese et\\u00a0al. 2019), and misrepresent conflicts (Hattingh 2014). For example, as was shown in a case study about perceptions of the benefits from and threats to nature in Tierra del Fuego National Park in Argentina, assuming that stakeholders are only motivated by monetary gains does not correspond to the values expressed by the park's primary users and prevents environmental management to better align with public perceptions and needs (Mrotek et\\u00a0al. 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10831222\", \"pmid\": \"38313563\", \"reference_ids\": [\"bib132\", \"bib41\", \"bib89\", \"bib162\", \"bib176\", \"bib71\", \"bib62\", \"bib79\", \"bib89\", \"bib86\", \"bib43\", \"bib21\", \"bib155\", \"bib76\"], \"section\": \"Implication of value pluralism guided by the core meanings and fuzzy boundaries for policy and valuation of NCP\", \"text\": \"In policymaking, relational values, as they are defined according to the proposed core meaning in the present article, can help articulate, as has emerged from the literature review, the idea that a specific place\\u2014a forest, a river, a landscape, or a population\\u2014are essentially important to people because of the unique relationships, history, and traditions that bind them together, as is expressed, for example, in the Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsur\\u014d\\u2019s concept of f\\u016bdo (\\u98a8\\u571f), which refers to interrelationships between people and local characteristics (Prominski 2014). To date, relational values in policy documents primarily highlight targets and strategies rather than direct specific actions, but the academic literature suggests that they can benefit policies directly by accounting for contextual NCP (D\\u00edaz et\\u00a0al. 2018). Integrating relational values into policy actions can help operationalize broad policy guidance (e.g., IPBES) to regional, national, and local scales (Kitheka et\\u00a0al. 2019). Relational values can catalyze motivation and appeal to a broader audience (Stenseke 2018, Winkler and Hauck 2019), particularly for IPLC (Himes and Muraca 2018, Gould et\\u00a0al. 2019) and can increase the participation of different stakeholders (Jax et\\u00a0al. 2018, Kitheka et\\u00a0al. 2019). By stressing reciprocal relationships, they can facilitate social equity and environmental sustainability (Kenter et\\u00a0al. 2011, Diver et\\u00a0al. 2019). Although relational values can be assessed using sociocultural quantitative methods (Bryce et\\u00a0al. 2016, Schulz and Martin-Ortega 2018, Huynh et\\u00a0al. 2022), qualitative, participatory, and mixed methods approaches, as well as the employment of sociocultural indicators, more fully capture their meaning.\"}

Metadata

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