Zimbabwean civil society survival in the post-coup environment: a political settlements analysis
PMCID: PMC10033284
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Abstract
The political environment in post-independence Zimbabwe has been very hostile for interest groups, particularly since 2000 when civil society actions and opposition political activity formidably challenged the power and dominance of the ZANU PF party. However, the 2017 ouster of Robert Mugabe gave rise to renewed hope for political change. Using the political settlements theoretical framework, and data obtained from interviews with Zimbabwean civil society leaders, studies of legal documents, and government pronouncements, we analyze the changes in the relationship between the state and civil society groups during President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s regime. We find that, while civil society faced restrictions during Mugabe's tenure, their existence is now under much more scrutiny under Mnangagwa’s militarized government. This is because authoritarian regimes are more likely to increase the suppression of citizen voices when faced with growing citizen engagement.
Full Text
Democracy has had a good trajectory across the African continent. In the last thirty years, most countries have held successful and uninterrupted elections, and there has been a turnover in leadership and sustained peace in most countries (Cheeseman 2015). Much of this progress can be credited to the sustained growth and independence of interest groups and civil society. For example, Zimbabwe has over 35,000 formally registered (and hundreds more that operate informally) civil society organizations that remain crucial in maintaining space- albeit limited- for democratic discourse. Zimbabwean politics cannot be understood, nor can it exist without civil society (Chipato et al. 2020). These diverse organizations include churches, community groups of women and youth, groups representing minorities, especially in the disabled communities, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary citizens working informally to solve community and political issues.
The structure of Zimbabwe's civil society is beholden to the regime's whims forcing CSOs to constantly change their strategies in response to the prevailing political climate. In the early nineteen twenties, the earliest formalized CSOs were created to cater to the needs of rural women (Chipato et al. 2020). In the fifties, local groups formed to lobby the white colonial settler government for black people's issues. Eventually, many of these groups would unite under the banner of the anti-colonial movements. Between independence in 1980 and 1999, most civil society activities were focused on development issues, although a small minority continued to work on civic education. Civil society groups were also folded into trade unions and labor activism. However, the HIV pandemic again shifted the focus on CSOs, with many organizations pivoting to work on AIDS-related issues. The shifts in CSO focus until then had primarily been influenced by need and available funding. In the post-2000 era, as political and economic conditions deteriorated, opposition parties' strength increased, and civil society organizations became more preoccupied with political issues and human rights. Because CSOs working on political rights were naturally aligned with the opposition movement, the government became highly hostile toward civil society leading to the unjust imprisonment of hundreds of political and non-governmental actors.
In November 2017, officers from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) ousted former president Robert Mugabe, who had been in office since Zimbabwe attained independence from colonialism in 1980 from office in a guardian coup. A guardian coup occurs when the military promises minimal political intervention, and their involvement will end as soon as there is a qualified civilian leadership (Dendere 2017). Unlike coups elsewhere on the continent, various civil society organizations (CSO) and the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), were very actively involved in the coup and called for Mugabe to step down. There was a general expectation that the political demise of Robert Mugabe would lead to a more politically open Zimbabwe. There was even some hope that his successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom the military-appointed, might lead to democratic reform like Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, who came in via a coup and successfully transitioned toward democracy (Rwodzi 2019).
In the first months of his presidency, Mnangagwa’s regime appeared to be on a path toward democracy. During the post-coup election period between November 2017 and May 2018, the opposition campaigned with more freedom than they had previously. Leaders from various civil society organizations interviewed for this paper also reported that their organizations could do their work with very little government interference. Although most international observers could not enter Zimbabwe to observe the elections, regional and local groups could freely mobilize voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns. Organizations working on food aid distribution had unrestricted access to citizens, especially in peri-urban and rural areas. Under the Mugabe regime, it was not always easy to access rural areas, and in rare cases, food distribution was partisan (Mwonzora & Mandikwaza 2019). One CSO leader said, “it was refreshing to get people the things they needed without fear” (Lovemore 2021). Local leaders in diverse communities shared her sentiments.
“Political settlement” refers to the distribution of power between influential groups in a particular country that is a product of the struggle between these groups and influences the distribution of power (Khan 2018). Political settlements also arise out of the deals and compromise that groups make at elite and non-elite levels (Khan 2018). The political settlements approach views competition and the struggle for political power and material resources as the primary factor in understanding the dynamics of human interaction (Gray 2019). Thus, a ‘settlement’ denotes a balance of power that can be discerned over a relatively long period, spanning a few years. (Khan 2018). This balance of power influences political outcomes, such as the institutions and policies that define and regulate life and other political events. It also affects the existence and function of other political actors operating within the established political settlement.
Political settlements are subject to ongoing change, resulting, for instance, from political events, such as elections or a coup. This leads to other configurations of power that have corresponding effects on a country’s institutions (Gray 2019). The patterns of political competition resulting from either elite or non-elite action alter the configurations of power in favor of specific groups, coalitions, or regimes (Gray 2019). Bargains and deal-making between elite actors and non-elite supporters also shift the status quo, establishing political institutions or outcomes that mutually benefit them (Di John and Putzel 2009). This power shift becomes a ‘settlement’ when it is acknowledged and accepted by other competing actors, giving way to stability and institutional developments.
Political settlements can be classified as inclusive, exclusive, and transitional. Inclusive settlements, commonly associated with developed western societies, entail a political-administrative system whose institutions promote efficiency and long-term institutional stability and where independent government bureaucracies largely control political and distributive power instead of informal patronage networks (Khan 2010). Exclusive settlements arise when political and institutional power lies in a small coalition of actors that exploits public institutions for their partial gains at the expense of most of the population (Kelsall 2016). This is often the case in developing nations with relatively underdeveloped political institutions, whereby public goods are distributed based on patronage politics instead of impartial institutions of governance. Transitional settlements describe a scenario where the redistribution of power is underway. Transitions can be recurring political events, such as elections, a political coup, or any other challenge to the incumbent coalition’s power and hegemony, potentially resulting in a reconfiguration of the balance of power (Kelsall 2016).
The analytical pillars of the Political Settlements framework are historical dynamics, actors and their interests, sources of power, and institutional outcomes (Behuria et al. 2017; Khan 2018; Gray 2019). The historical analysis provides vital background information that explains observable political dynamics. In Africa, for instance, histories of colonial rule, the Cold War, and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) considerably shaped the nature and function of political institutions that define various aspects of life in the present day. Secondly, the identity of specific political actors, who can be individuals or groups at the elite and non-elite levels, and their interests is a key component of political settlements because actors’ identities and interests are often intertwined, which explains their collaboration and contestation patterns. For instance, some post-colonial African countries have had ethnically patterned political mobilization and conflict, such as the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe between 1982 and 1987, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and more recently, the civil war in Ethiopia. Indeed, ethnic identities often underlie patronage networks through which holders of political office distribute public goods or other forms of material gain (Berman 1998).
Power is another fundamental feature of the political settlements approach, particularly its relational nature. It is defined as an actor’s capacity to impose their will over others or influence their choices or actions directly or indirectly (Dahl 1957; Weber 1965). The sources, nature, and extent of actors’ power influence competing actors’ reactions, shape the patterns of competition or collaboration, and subsequently impact outcomes. In other words, power is the ‘currency’ of politics. The fourth analytical component of the political settlements approach is that of political institutions. Unlike institutional analysis, which focuses on the extent to which the nature and quality of public institutions and governance explain political outcomes, political settlements view the nature and function of formal institutions and policy outcomes as a result or a reflection of underlying informal power dynamics (Khan 2018). Powerful coalitions establish and support institutions that guarantee their interests and vice versa.
Several scholars have employed this approach to analyze various issues in African studies. For example, Jonathan DiJohn, James Putzel, and Amy Poteete applied the framework to analyze Botswana’s political system and management of the diamond sector, finding that its political stability is not necessarily based on institutions alone but the political negotiations and bargaining between powerful domestic and external actors: the ruling Botswana Democratic Party and its leadership, traditional chiefs, cattle ranchers, De Beers Diamond Corporation, and the British government (Di John and Putzel 2009; Poteete 2009). Taodzera (2020) applies the political settlements approach to disprove speculation of an impending ‘resource curse’ arising in Uganda, prescribing a comprehensive, multi-pronged analysis of the governance of the oil sector instead of employing the conventional analyses that privilege institutions of Weberian standards, mostly present in ‘First World’ countries (Taodzera 2020). Abdulai and Hickey also use the approach to study Ghana’s government’s spending patterns in the education sector, finding that the level of control that regional elites wielded in central government corresponded to the degree of funding allocated to their home regions, which revealed the influence of underlying political settlements on national formal education policy outputs (Abdulai and Hickey 2016).
The roots of the ZANU PF regime’s authoritarian nature lie in the history of militarized anti-colonial activism. Having been a settler colony, Zimbabwe’s transition to independence entailed a protracted struggle between various armed and unarmed groups, notably the settler colonial government of Ian D. Smith (Evans 2007). Months of targeted military attacks from ZANU’s army forced the Smith regime to negotiate with the black politicians at the Lancaster House peace talks in 1979. The Lancaster peace negotiations culminated in the 1980 elections that brought Mugabe into office. The majority of ZANU’s war-era leadership became part of the new democratic government, including the current President Mnangagwa and his deputy, General Constantino Chiwenga. Although it claims to be a democratic civilian-led party, ZANU PF is, at its core, still a hierarchical military movement inhospitable to internal and external dissent. Its history of militarization has had far-reaching effects on its present-day structure and culture (Southall 2013).
The party is beholden to a top-down hierarchical system as a formerly armed movement. The leadership is intolerant of dissent, regarding it as disloyalty and, at its worst, ‘selling out, resulting in ostracization or expulsion (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010). This is demonstrated in ZANU PF’s trajectory in the post-independence, whereby prominent ZANU PF leaders who criticized Mugabe were expelled from the party and wound up in political opposition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). Such (popular) leaders include the late Margaret Dongo, Eddison Zvobgo, and former finance minister Simba Makoni in more recent times. Therefore, ZANU PF’s culture of intolerance to dissent extends to interest groups and civil society organizations. Interest groups and civil society are typically regarded as ‘sellouts’ working at the behest of countries such as the USA and the United Kingdom, the former colonial power, to return the country to colonial subordination. ZANU PF’s intolerance of citizen-led interest groups partly has roots in its history as an armed movement with a rigid hierarchical structure and weaponization of liberation ideology to attack civil society groups and any other perceived threats to its hold on power.
We focus on the post-coup leadership of ZANU PF under President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his deputy, former army commander General Constantino Chiwenga. The two men pull the levers of power and have primarily been responsible for the onslaught of violence against interest groups and civil society activity in Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa participated in the liberation struggle as part of a crop of young guerilla fighters who received military training at the height of the anti-colonial movement in then Rhodesia under the banner of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of the ZANU party (Tendi 2016). One of the defining features of Mnangagwa’s career is his close working and personal relationship with Mugabe, and he was long viewed as his successor. Mnangagwa had deep links with the military leadership, notably his close allyship with Chiwenga. This explained the army’s actions in neutralizing factions of the security sector loyal to Mugabe and installing Mnangagwa into office during the coup in 2017 (Cropley 2017). Mnangagwa has, for decades, been steeped in ZANU PF’s culture and leadership structures and has a well-documented authoritarian streak that has been manifest since he seized power.
Chiwenga, who never held political office until his appointment to the vice presidency in 2017, is also a former combatant and rose through the ranks to become the ZANLA Deputy Political Commissar1 in 1978 (Zulu 2017). At independence in 1980, he was incorporated into the newly established Zimbabwe National Army, rising to Lieutenant-General in 1994, then commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces in 2004 (Zulu 2017). He held this position until his retirement and appointment as vice president in 2017. However, he remains influential in the security services sector. He is chair of the Joint Operations Command, which brings together all the country’s security organs (army, air force, intelligence, police, and prison services.) Most importantly, Chiwenga coordinated the coup that brought Mnangagwa into power after his flight to exile in South Africa following his dismissal by Mugabe in 2017. Chiwenga is, in effect, the force behind the throne (Harvey and Alden 2020). As a career soldier since the liberation era, Chiwenga has been grounded in the hierarchical institutions and cultures of the army that are antithetical to the dialogic, interactive nature of democracy, of which interest groups are an essential component.
Although these two leaders have considerable influence over the party and government, it is essential to note that ZANU PF is not monolithic and homogenous at this juncture. Instead, it is a coalition of groups vested in the party’s continued power. At the elite level is the political leadership, from its top decision-making organs such as the Central Committee2 and Politburo3 to its provincial and district structures, chief security officers in the army, police, intelligence, and prisons, a faction of the war veterans, and militia groups such as Chipangano, which the party uses to attack and intimidate civil society and opposition party activists (Mutongwizo 2014). At the non-elite level, the regime has an extensive patronage network, which consists of the leaders mentioned above, their family members and acquaintances, supporters of the party, and businesspeople who act as both financiers of the party, and beneficiaries of its patronage through access to tenders and other lucrative business opportunities accessed through state entities.4
Thus, Mnangagwa, Chiwenga, and the rest of the ZANU PF top brass and members of the patronage cartel have a vested interest in maintaining hegemonic control over the country’s political system for political and economic reasons. The government is, in effect, the ZANU PF’s cartel’s means of access to material benefits and livelihoods. Several corruption scandals have revealed the deep web of linkages between top government officials and local and international beneficiaries.5 ZANU PF functionaries at various levels of the organization’s hierarchy depend on their political offices and the party’s hold over power for their livelihood. This was demonstrated by the degree to which several former leaders, expelled from the government after the November 2017 coup, fell on hard times soon after. Thus, the line between government business and private interests is blurred because of state capture and politics of patronage. Civil society organizations’ activities are, therefore, a threat to these intertwined objectives of the ZANU PF cartel: control of the state and access to economic benefits.
An analysis of the ruling of the ZANU PF regime’s primary sources of power demonstrates its inability to accommodate a vibrant and unconstrained civil society sector. Masunungure and Bratton (2011) show that the country’s military and security agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), underwrite the regime’s power and extended stay in office (Masunungure 2011; Bratton 2014). Security agents maintain the status quo through direct attacks, threats, or violence against the political opposition and civil society activists who speak out against the government or challenge its power in any manner the regime deems threatening.
Secondly, the ZANU PF regime exploits state institutions, resulting in the conflation of ZANU PF as a party and the government of Zimbabwe. Government institutions have, since independence, operated in service of ZANU PF’s interests instead of being impartial distributors of public goods, mainly through sources of patronage and as tools for attacking political opponents. For instance, the party abuses state resources, such as public funds, vehicles, fuel, and state-owned media, mainly the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), to run its political campaigns (Magaisa 2019; Ndakaripa 2020). It has a well-documented, profoundly entrenched culture of patronage and cronyism that includes irregularly awarding tenders to government officials and their cronies and outright theft of public funds through various strategies. Examples of large-scale corruption include the Willowvale car procurement scandal in 19886 and, more recently, multiple corruption and fraud cases involving President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s close associate, Kudakwashe Tagwirei, and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga (Sharife and Anderson 2021).
Besides using the government as a cash cow, ZANU PF instrumentalizes the judiciary to attack political opponents (Magaisa 2019). The party has a well-documented record of employing intelligence agents and police officers to abduct and detain civil society and opposition activists for extended periods without trial (US Embassy in Zimbabwe 2017). Civil society activists and opposition leaders have been arraigned before the courts on trumped-up charges and subjected to lengthy, costly, and humiliating judicial processes (HRW Report 2008; FH Report: Zimbabwe 2021). Since 2018, ZANU PF has intensified its attacks on opposition activists from the leading opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and numerous independent journalists(Muronzi 2022. Those who have suffered state brutality include a member of parliament who has been repeatedly denied bail and remains in prison after more than 200 days as of January 2023. Others include party spokesperson Fadzayi Mahere who is frequently called to court over frivolous charges. Activists from Matabeleland spent a night in jail after attending the Gukurahundi commemoration in December 2022, and have been repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for extended periods as part of the ZANU PF regime’s tactics to intimidate the leaders, their supporters, and allies). The regime employs “rule by law,” or judicial purposes, as a tool of political persecution to wear out opponents and instill fear in would-be critics. By and large, Zimbabwe’s judiciary is biased, and most rulings, especially in politically sensitive cases, go the way of the party (Magaisa 2020).
The ZANU PF regime’s third power source is ideological: the party’s revolutionary narrative and propaganda. ZANU PF, like South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and Namibia’s South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), continually portrays its leaders as heroes of the anti-colonial, revolutionary activism and armed campaigns that delivered the country’s independence from colonial rule (Clapham 2012; Southall 2013). This message resonates with the party’s supporters, particularly those in rural areas. In this vein, the party deploys this ‘liberation ideology’ that any kind of opposition political organization and civil society activism against ZANU PF is ‘unpatriotic’ and a threat to the country’s independence—thus conflating its definition of patriotism with zealous support for ZANU PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). As a result, opponents of the ruling party, both in the country’s opposition parties and critics in the civil society, are branded as ‘sellouts’ who endeavor to deliver the country back to the clutches of British colonialism and neo-imperial domination by other European countries and the USA.
The preceding analysis of Zimbabwe's political system provides an important background to the country’s civil society’s complicated relationship with the state in the post-independence era. While the government has openly received aid via NGO channels, CSOs have also been consistently met with suspicion and accused of being western-funded to destabilize the government (Dorman 2003; Kandemiiri 2013). ZANU PF has always been quick to silence civil society organizations that engaged in human rights-related work or criticized the government for human rights abuses, both by omission and commission. For example, during Mugabe’s time, Dr. Mashiri (not her real name) worked with a women’s trust organization in the early 2000s. She recalled heightened scrutiny on their work after the 2000 election, which saw ZANU PF losing its senate majority for the first time. Their organization has always been a trusted agency for advocating for victims of domestic violence and those living with HIV. Still, the government was suddenly concerned that their advocacy had become too political. Indeed, by 2004 ZANU PF minister of Public Service and Social Welfare, Paul Mangwana, was actively campaigning against civil society groups. In 2004, he was quoted saying the following about CSOSs:
Some NGOs and churches are causing too much confusion in the country because they are converting their humanitarian programs into politics … The government cannot allow that to happen, so we are saying they should go under scrutiny where we revise all modalities of their operations in the country.7
During Mr. Mangwana’s tenure, the government introduced the first bill geared toward giving the government more control over the work of NGOs and churches. A reverend affiliated with the Methodist church interviewed under anonymity for this paper recalls that starting in 2004, churches were asked to provide details about their membership. The government was concerned that churches were working with western journalists or harboring opposition activists on the run. By November 2004, the government had suspended the constitution to fast-track the NGO bill. Precedence for restrictive laws that prevented citizens from agitating for their rights had been set two years prior with the passing of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). These two legislative acts directly targeted media groups (Crisis Coalition 2004). The situation progressively worsened through the remainder of Mugabe’s term. However, CSOs remained resolute, and there was much active work on human rights and exposing government malpractice in various areas.
However, in June 2021, the government threatened NGOs through rhetoric and legislation. Government spokesperson George Charamba said, “We cannot allow, internally, any organization which we register under our statutes to subvert the sovereignty and integrity of Zimbabwe” (Chidakwa 2021). In the same statement, the government repeated its narrative that many NGOs are working under a sole mandate for regime change and that “very few of them are helping to build schools, clinics, to give livelihoods to our people through irrigation schemes. All of them are employed to achieve regime change in Zimbabwe. We condemn it as they are calculated to undermine the orderly evolution of our political, economic, and judicial systems and must be condemned” (Chidakwa 2021).
Mnangagwa’s government also introduced restrictive laws to curtail civic space, a tactic frequently used during Mugabe’s tenure of office. The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Amendment Bill to restrict civil society space, introduced in 2021, is a case in point. According to the government, the Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Bill 2021 is being proposed “to comply with the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) recommendations to Zimbabwe. Further, it has become necessary to streamline administrative procedures for private voluntary organizations to allow for efficient regulation and registration.” (GOV OF ZIMBABWE 2021). The government also claims that the bill will assist in preventing money laundering and bringing the country into compliance with international law. The bill is an amendment to the very restrictive Private Voluntary Acts (1996, 2002), and the proposed changes will give the executive more power to closely monitor civil society's activities and constant evaluation that their mission is complementary to that of the ruling party (Chifamba 2021b).
Another draconian strategy to stifle civil society activity through monitoring and surveillance is President Mnangagwa’s creation of a new and largely unconstitutional role of ten Provincial Development Coordinators in August 2020 (Ncube 2020). Their job was described as assisting the Ministry of Local Affairs, another controversial ministry, with technical and administrative support. Efforts to lobby against the creation of this office by citizens and civil society failed. By December 2021, Mnangagwa announced that the Provincial Development Coordinators would be promoted and given even more powers that potentially curtail civil society activities. In June 2021, the Provincial Development Coordinator (PDC) of Harare, Tafadzwa Muguti, stated that all NGOs operating in the capital city, Harare, would now need to seek permission to use through his office beginning July 2021. Consistent with the new regime rhetoric, in his public address, Mr. Muguti emphasized that civil society and business entities seeking to work in Zimbabwe would be watched closely: “The first task is unbundling ministry duties to the province. I will be meeting captains of the industry to hear what they will be able to contribute to our provincial economic plan. Everything we do as Harare is under the spotlight. Anyone who flies into Zimbabwe meets us first.” (Munhende 2021).
This policy has no constitutional mandate, which violates freedom of speech and expression. The goal of these mandates is twofold, first, to criminalize the work of civil society organizations and, secondly, to trap them in a never-ending cycle of government red tape. The constant changes in government personnel due to intra-party fighting further complicates the civil society groups' ability to adhere to the regulations. The anticipated chaos started shortly after the announcement. In late July 2021, there was an attempt to ban all non-compliant organizations, which failed to take effect after civil society organizations filed a successful petition with the courts (Mabika 2021). Government officials had announced that out of the over 3000 CSOs working in Zimbabwe, only 40 were compliant. Ironically, their ban extended to the first lady’s controversial charity organization, Angel of Hope Foundation, partly explaining why the courts dismissed the ban announcement. Nevertheless, as expected, all other NGOs had spent their limited resources fighting another court battle they did not need to engage in (Human Rights Forum 2021). Mugabe’s government routinely used the same tools of repression against civil society, and now Mnangagwa is further refining the strategies.
Besides using the law to undermine civil society activity, Mnangagwa’s government has also employed co-option as part of his regime’s carrot-and-stick strategy. This strategy aims to diffuse the power of non-aligned interest groups and persons and centralize control within the state. To this end, the government has created interest groups like the Presidential Advisory Council, a 26-member Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) in 2019 consisting of eminent figures and experts from business, health, agriculture, civil society, faith-based organizations, and education a few months after the 2018 elections (The Herald Zimbabwe 2019). Mnangagwa indicated that the purpose for establishing the PAC was to receive expert and unbiased input in policy formulation, especially the government’s Vision 2030 agenda, from a group of knowledgeable and unbiased citizens (Staff Reporter_Zimbabwe Mail 2019). The council’s membership included formerly fierce opponents of ZANU PF in civil society and churches. This was consistent with Mnangagwa’s strategy to bring critics under his wing. As expected, public response was mixed; others criticized the bloated nature of the council and the costs involved, while others also lauded the president for a diverse and inclusive team of advisors.
Although the PAC is not the traditional type of interest group, its membership includes NGOs and civil society, so it is worth a brief discussion. For example, Kenneth Mtata, secretary of the Zimbabwe Council for Churches, has traditionally spoken out against ZANU PF. It is not surprising then that since the last election, church leaders have been more open in their support for the president and even, at one point, called for a suspension of elections, arguing that the nation needed an extended period of healing from politics (Anli 2019). In a country where over 90% of voters report a Christian affiliation, the church’s backdoor endorsement of ZANU PF is impactful. The formal church formations were also important allies for pro-democracy groups during the Mugabe era. However, they, too, have moved toward supporting the Mnangagwa regime. In interviews with various bishops, they indicated that their support for the new president was anchored in the optimistic belief that he would live up to his promises. Mnangagwa has also been successful at pitting younger church leaders who fit the bill of social media influencers who have millions of followers on social media against more older church leaders who are not easily bought off. Church leaders willing to work with the president have been rewarded with high-level ambassadorial posts. The goal of doing this is to cause fissures within various civil society structures.
In addition to targeting religious organizations, the Mnangagwa regime has also gone after the media. Early PAC members included media mogul Trevor Ncube who was forced into exile for over two decades during the Mugabe years for exposing state brutality. By including Mr. Ncube, Mnangagwa was signaling that he would work with independent media, an area previously closed off to ZANU PF. Mr. Ncube’s newspaper, The Independent, was among a dozen private media houses subjected to state-sponsored attacks, which included bombings since the early 2000s (Meldrum 2001). That Mr. Ncube accepted work with Mnangagwa sent a strong signal that he believed free and independent media had a chance under Mnangagwa. However, the militarized government of Mnangagwa cannot function alongside institutions of democracy. Although Mr. Ncube has yet to speak publicly about his experience within the PAC, he has indicated that he officially resigned from the organization, citing disagreements on democratic norms with the president (Chibamu 2022). Subsequently, the independent media has been left in chaos. Independent journalists continue to be harassed and jailed without course. The weakening of various interest groups strengthens the regime's strategies.
Mnangagwa’s government has also committed to changing the perceptions about ZANU PF's relationship with the business world and appointed several business executives to the PAC. This includes Natalie Jabangwe, EcoCash's partner company of ECONET, the largest company in Zimbabwe. This appointment was also critical because the founder and owner of ECONET, Mr. Strive Masiyiwa, has been in exile since 1999 following many attempts on his life by the government. This appointment signaled that Mnangagwa was extending an olive branch to many in the business world who felt unsafe under Mugabe. The strategy worked, at least for a little while. Although Masiyiwa did not physically return home, he used his public voice on social media to shore up support for Mnangagwa and provided much-needed financial support (Staff Writer, 2018). There was also a rush to return home by other business exiles such as Mutumwa Mawere (Guma 2010) and another media mogul, James Makamba (Staff Reporter 2017).
In addition to forming the PAC and as part of his co-option strategy toward critics, Mnangagwa used his executive powers to make the Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD), a coalition of 2018 election losers minus Nelson Chamisa, leader of the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), the country’s largest opposition political party, and himself (Helliker and Chikozho Mazarire 2021). As with the PAC, POLAD brings together some of ZANU PF’s most vocal opponents, including Thokozani Khupe, Douglas Mwonzora, and Lovemore Madhuku. POLAD has justified its participation by arguing that this organization is part of a thriving civil society that sees political parties of different frameworks working together (Chifamba 2021a). Political parties merit mention here because they are essential to the civil society community. They serve to advocate for the issues most important to their constituencies. Between 1980 and 1999, Zimbabwe functioned as a de facto one-party state with very little opposition. The rise of the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 marked a shift in Zimbabwe’s democratic journey. For the last two decades, the MDC has enrichened political discourse and curtailed some of ZANU PFs worst tendencies. Mnangagwa’s regime is interested in closing this political space and creating a de facto one-party state.
In his words, Mr. Madhuku member of POLAD said, “POLAD is a useful platform that can be a way forward for Zimbabwe because it allows [political] losers to work with winners, and this must be adopted across African countries such as Zambia and Botswana. As NCA, we believe that it is an important way of governing the affairs of society, and voters need to know that governance is not only for those who won an election, but [also for] those that have lost so that the nation progresses by working together.” (Chifamba 2021a). Political analysts, including Alex Magaisa, Phelan Zamchiya, and Brian Raftopolous, interviewed for this paper, argue that POLAD is just another attempt to sow further division in the opposition and buy loyalty. Members of both POLAD and the PAC have been given a lot of perks, including luxury vehicles. In a country where the economy is failing, it is tough for individuals to walk away from such benefits. As a result, the country’s political opposition is more divided than it has ever been. Under such circumstances, it is easy for the ruling party to pit individuals against each other and bait weaker members with financial incentives. A weakened opposition has also made it harder for other civil society organizations to rally under a special message.
Although most CSOs remain opposed to government interference, unlike in the Mugabe era, there appears to be a more significant schism in how CSOs respond to government restrictions. In an interview with the founder and leader of an organization that works on women’s and children’s rights, they said they had no issue with these new directives. They argued that their organization was compliant and that others should follow the law. When asked why they did not see these measures as problematic when they had previously lobbied against similar efforts during the Mugabe era, they shrugged and said, “things are different now. Mugabe is gone. We must rebuild the country” (Tariro, name changed, 2021). This is a common refrain from former opposition and civil society leaders who have opted to work with Mnangagwa. Another interviewee who worked for an organization dedicated to promoting voter participation shared the same sentiments adding that “we have to stop talking bad about our country.” (MARY, name changed, 2021).
One might say that there is some creeping fatigue with fighting losing battles against a government that will not likely lose power. For those who do not see a post-ZANU PF era anytime soon, it is much easier to cut their losses and work within the framework of the government. The same leader from the children and women’s organization also added that “not everything has to be political. I choose to focus on educating every child regardless of the party affiliation of their parents” (Tariro, name changed, 2021). The government has praised their organization as an example of good citizenship. It is too early to know if these organizations and individuals willing to tow the party line will continue to do so and if the government will treat them positively. It is also telling that although both Mary and Tariro had positive things to say about their experience working under the Mnangagwa regimes, they feared having their actual identities associated with their comments.
Sections
"[{\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR7\"], \"section\": \"Introduction\", \"text\": \"Democracy has had a good trajectory across the African continent. In the last thirty years, most countries have held successful and uninterrupted elections, and there has been a turnover in leadership and sustained peace in most countries (Cheeseman 2015). Much of this progress can be credited to the sustained growth and independence of interest groups and civil society. For example, Zimbabwe has over 35,000 formally registered (and hundreds more that operate informally) civil society organizations that remain crucial in maintaining space- albeit limited- for democratic discourse. Zimbabwean politics cannot be understood, nor can it exist without civil society (Chipato et al. 2020). These diverse organizations include churches, community groups of women and youth, groups representing minorities, especially in the disabled communities, non-governmental organizations, and ordinary citizens working informally to solve community and political issues.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR46\"], \"section\": \"Introduction\", \"text\": \"The structure of Zimbabwe's civil society is beholden to the regime's whims forcing CSOs to constantly change their strategies in response to the prevailing political climate. In the early nineteen twenties, the earliest formalized CSOs were created to cater to the needs of rural women (Chipato et al. 2020). In the fifties, local groups formed to lobby the white colonial settler government for black people's issues. Eventually, many of these groups would unite under the banner of the anti-colonial movements. Between independence in 1980 and 1999, most civil society activities were focused on development issues, although a small minority continued to work on civic education. Civil society groups were also folded into trade unions and labor activism. However, the HIV pandemic again shifted the focus on CSOs, with many organizations pivoting to work on AIDS-related issues. The shifts in CSO focus until then had primarily been influenced by need and available funding. In the post-2000 era, as political and economic conditions deteriorated, opposition parties' strength increased, and civil society organizations became more preoccupied with political issues and human rights. Because CSOs working on political rights were naturally aligned with the opposition movement, the government became highly hostile toward civil society leading to the unjust imprisonment of hundreds of political and non-governmental actors.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR18\", \"CR53\"], \"section\": \"Zimbabwe after Mugabe: background\", \"text\": \"In November 2017, officers from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) ousted former president Robert Mugabe, who had been in office since Zimbabwe attained independence from colonialism in 1980 from office in a guardian coup. A guardian coup occurs when the military promises minimal political intervention, and their involvement will end as soon as there is a qualified civilian leadership (Dendere 2017). Unlike coups elsewhere on the continent, various civil society organizations (CSO) and the leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), were very actively involved in the coup and called for Mugabe to step down. There was a general expectation that the political demise of Robert Mugabe would lead to a more politically open Zimbabwe. There was even some hope that his successor, Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom the military-appointed, might lead to democratic reform like Ghana\\u2019s Jerry Rawlings, who came in via a coup and successfully transitioned toward democracy (Rwodzi 2019).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR45\", \"CR20\"], \"section\": \"Zimbabwe after Mugabe: background\", \"text\": \"In the first months of his presidency, Mnangagwa\\u2019s regime appeared to be on a path toward democracy. During the post-coup election period between November 2017 and May 2018, the opposition campaigned with more freedom than they had previously. Leaders from various civil society organizations interviewed for this paper also reported that their organizations could do their work with very little government interference. Although most international observers could not enter Zimbabwe to observe the elections, regional and local groups could freely mobilize voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns. Organizations working on food aid distribution had unrestricted access to citizens, especially in peri-urban and rural areas. Under the Mugabe regime, it was not always easy to access rural areas, and in rare cases, food distribution was partisan (Mwonzora & Mandikwaza 2019). One CSO leader said, \\u201cit was refreshing to get people the things they needed without fear\\u201d (Lovemore 2021). Local leaders in diverse communities shared her sentiments.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR32\", \"CR32\", \"CR24\", \"CR32\"], \"section\": \"Explaining Mnangagwa\\u2019s ZANU PF regime\\u2019s stance: a political settlements lens\", \"text\": \"\\u201cPolitical settlement\\u201d refers to the distribution of power between influential groups in a particular country that is a product of the struggle between these groups and influences the distribution of power (Khan 2018). Political settlements also arise out of the deals and compromise that groups make at elite and non-elite levels (Khan 2018). The political settlements approach views competition and the struggle for political power and material resources as the primary factor in understanding the dynamics of human interaction (Gray 2019). Thus, a \\u2018settlement\\u2019 denotes a balance of power that can be discerned over a relatively long period, spanning a few years. (Khan 2018). This balance of power influences political outcomes, such as the institutions and policies that define and regulate life and other political events. It also affects the existence and function of other political actors operating within the established political settlement.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR24\", \"CR24\", \"CR80\"], \"section\": \"Explaining Mnangagwa\\u2019s ZANU PF regime\\u2019s stance: a political settlements lens\", \"text\": \"Political settlements are subject to ongoing change, resulting, for instance, from political events, such as elections or a coup. This leads to other configurations of power that have corresponding effects on a country\\u2019s institutions (Gray 2019). The patterns of political competition resulting from either elite or non-elite action alter the configurations of power in favor of specific groups, coalitions, or regimes (Gray 2019). Bargains and deal-making between elite actors and non-elite supporters also shift the status quo, establishing political institutions or outcomes that mutually benefit them (Di John and Putzel 2009). This power shift becomes a \\u2018settlement\\u2019 when it is acknowledged and accepted by other competing actors, giving way to stability and institutional developments.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR31\", \"CR30\", \"CR30\"], \"section\": \"Explaining Mnangagwa\\u2019s ZANU PF regime\\u2019s stance: a political settlements lens\", \"text\": \"Political settlements can be classified as inclusive, exclusive, and transitional. Inclusive settlements, commonly associated with developed western societies, entail a political-administrative system whose institutions promote efficiency and long-term institutional stability and where independent government bureaucracies largely control political and distributive power instead of informal patronage networks (Khan 2010). Exclusive settlements arise when political and institutional power lies in a small coalition of actors that exploits public institutions for their partial gains at the expense of most of the population (Kelsall 2016). This is often the case in developing nations with relatively underdeveloped political institutions, whereby public goods are distributed based on patronage politics instead of impartial institutions of governance. Transitional settlements describe a scenario where the redistribution of power is underway. Transitions can be recurring political events, such as elections, a political coup, or any other challenge to the incumbent coalition\\u2019s power and hegemony, potentially resulting in a reconfiguration of the balance of power (Kelsall 2016).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR4\", \"CR32\", \"CR24\", \"CR5\"], \"section\": \"Explaining Mnangagwa\\u2019s ZANU PF regime\\u2019s stance: a political settlements lens\", \"text\": \"The analytical pillars of the Political Settlements framework are historical dynamics, actors and their interests, sources of power, and institutional outcomes (Behuria et al. 2017; Khan 2018; Gray 2019). The historical analysis provides vital background information that explains observable political dynamics. In Africa, for instance, histories of colonial rule, the Cold War, and Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) considerably shaped the nature and function of political institutions that define various aspects of life in the present day. Secondly, the identity of specific political actors, who can be individuals or groups at the elite and non-elite levels, and their interests is a key component of political settlements because actors\\u2019 identities and interests are often intertwined, which explains their collaboration and contestation patterns. For instance, some post-colonial African countries have had ethnically patterned political mobilization and conflict, such as the Gukurahundi genocide in Zimbabwe between 1982 and 1987, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and more recently, the civil war in Ethiopia. Indeed, ethnic identities often underlie patronage networks through which holders of political office distribute public goods or other forms of material gain (Berman 1998).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR17\", \"CR61\", \"CR32\"], \"section\": \"Explaining Mnangagwa\\u2019s ZANU PF regime\\u2019s stance: a political settlements lens\", \"text\": \"Power is another fundamental feature of the political settlements approach, particularly its relational nature. It is defined as an actor\\u2019s capacity to impose their will over others or influence their choices or actions directly or indirectly (Dahl 1957; Weber 1965). The sources, nature, and extent of actors\\u2019 power influence competing actors\\u2019 reactions, shape the patterns of competition or collaboration, and subsequently impact outcomes. In other words, power is the \\u2018currency\\u2019 of politics. The fourth analytical component of the political settlements approach is that of political institutions. Unlike institutional analysis, which focuses on the extent to which the nature and quality of public institutions and governance explain political outcomes, political settlements view the nature and function of formal institutions and policy outcomes as a result or a reflection of underlying informal power dynamics (Khan 2018). Powerful coalitions establish and support institutions that guarantee their interests and vice versa.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR80\", \"CR50\", \"CR56\", \"CR56\", \"CR1\"], \"section\": \"Explaining Mnangagwa\\u2019s ZANU PF regime\\u2019s stance: a political settlements lens\", \"text\": \"Several scholars have employed this approach to analyze various issues in African studies. For example, Jonathan DiJohn, James Putzel, and Amy Poteete applied the framework to analyze Botswana\\u2019s political system and management of the diamond sector, finding that its political stability is not necessarily based on institutions alone but the political negotiations and bargaining between powerful domestic and external actors: the ruling Botswana Democratic Party and its leadership, traditional chiefs, cattle ranchers, De Beers Diamond Corporation, and the British government (Di John and Putzel 2009; Poteete 2009). Taodzera (2020) applies the political settlements approach to disprove speculation of an impending \\u2018resource curse\\u2019 arising in Uganda, prescribing a comprehensive, multi-pronged analysis of the governance of the oil sector instead of employing the conventional analyses that privilege institutions of Weberian standards, mostly present in \\u2018First World\\u2019 countries (Taodzera 2020). Abdulai and Hickey also use the approach to study Ghana\\u2019s government\\u2019s spending patterns in the education sector, finding that the level of control that regional elites wielded in central government corresponded to the degree of funding allocated to their home regions, which revealed the influence of underlying political settlements on national formal education policy outputs (Abdulai and Hickey 2016).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR21\", \"CR55\"], \"section\": \"A history of colonial rule and revolutionary struggle\", \"text\": \"The roots of the ZANU PF regime\\u2019s authoritarian nature lie in the history of militarized anti-colonial activism. Having been a settler colony, Zimbabwe\\u2019s transition to independence entailed a protracted struggle between various armed and unarmed groups, notably the settler colonial government of Ian D. Smith (Evans 2007). Months of targeted military attacks from ZANU\\u2019s army forced the Smith regime to negotiate with the black politicians at the Lancaster House peace talks in 1979. The Lancaster peace negotiations culminated in the 1980 elections that brought Mugabe into office. The majority of ZANU\\u2019s war-era leadership became part of the new democratic government, including the current President Mnangagwa and his deputy, General Constantino Chiwenga. Although it claims to be a democratic civilian-led party, ZANU PF is, at its core, still a hierarchical military movement inhospitable to internal and external dissent. Its history of militarization has had far-reaching effects on its present-day structure and culture (Southall 2013).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR40\", \"CR48\"], \"section\": \"A history of colonial rule and revolutionary struggle\", \"text\": \"The party is beholden to a top-down hierarchical system as a formerly armed movement. The leadership is intolerant of dissent, regarding it as disloyalty and, at its worst, \\u2018selling out, resulting in ostracization or expulsion (Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010). This is demonstrated in ZANU PF\\u2019s trajectory in the post-independence, whereby prominent ZANU PF leaders who criticized Mugabe were expelled from the party and wound up in political opposition (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). Such (popular) leaders include the late Margaret Dongo, Eddison Zvobgo, and former finance minister Simba Makoni in more recent times. Therefore, ZANU PF\\u2019s culture of intolerance to dissent extends to interest groups and civil society organizations. Interest groups and civil society are typically regarded as \\u2018sellouts\\u2019 working at the behest of countries such as the USA and the United Kingdom, the former colonial power, to return the country to colonial subordination. ZANU PF\\u2019s intolerance of citizen-led interest groups partly has roots in its history as an armed movement with a rigid hierarchical structure and weaponization of liberation ideology to attack civil society groups and any other perceived threats to its hold on power.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR58\", \"CR16\"], \"section\": \"ZANU PF\\u2019s leadership and intertwined political and economic interests\", \"text\": \"We focus on the post-coup leadership of ZANU PF under President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his deputy, former army commander General Constantino Chiwenga. The two men pull the levers of power and have primarily been responsible for the onslaught of violence against interest groups and civil society activity in Zimbabwe. Mnangagwa participated in the liberation struggle as part of a crop of young guerilla fighters who received military training at the height of the anti-colonial movement in then Rhodesia under the banner of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the armed wing of the ZANU party (Tendi 2016). One of the defining features of Mnangagwa\\u2019s career is his close working and personal relationship with Mugabe, and he was long viewed as his successor. Mnangagwa had deep links with the military leadership, notably his close allyship with Chiwenga. This explained the army\\u2019s actions in neutralizing factions of the security sector loyal to Mugabe and installing Mnangagwa into office during the coup in 2017 (Cropley 2017). Mnangagwa has, for decades, been steeped in ZANU PF\\u2019s culture and leadership structures and has a well-documented authoritarian streak that has been manifest since he seized power.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"Fn1\", \"CR65\", \"CR65\", \"CR26\"], \"section\": \"ZANU PF\\u2019s leadership and intertwined political and economic interests\", \"text\": \"Chiwenga, who never held political office until his appointment to the vice presidency in 2017, is also a former combatant and rose through the ranks to become the ZANLA Deputy Political Commissar1 in 1978 (Zulu 2017). At independence in 1980, he was incorporated into the newly established Zimbabwe National Army, rising to Lieutenant-General in 1994, then commander of the Zimbabwe Defense Forces in 2004 (Zulu 2017). He held this position until his retirement and appointment as vice president in 2017. However, he remains influential in the security services sector. He is chair of the Joint Operations Command, which brings together all the country\\u2019s security organs (army, air force, intelligence, police, and prison services.) Most importantly, Chiwenga coordinated the coup that brought Mnangagwa into power after his flight to exile in South Africa following his dismissal by Mugabe in 2017. Chiwenga is, in effect, the force behind the throne (Harvey and Alden 2020). As a career soldier since the liberation era, Chiwenga has been grounded in the hierarchical institutions and cultures of the army that are antithetical to the dialogic, interactive nature of democracy, of which interest groups are an essential component.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"Fn2\", \"Fn3\", \"CR44\", \"Fn4\"], \"section\": \"ZANU PF\\u2019s leadership and intertwined political and economic interests\", \"text\": \"Although these two leaders have considerable influence over the party and government, it is essential to note that ZANU PF is not monolithic and homogenous at this juncture. Instead, it is a coalition of groups vested in the party\\u2019s continued power. At the elite level is the political leadership, from its top decision-making organs such as the Central Committee2 and Politburo3 to its provincial and district structures, chief security officers in the army, police, intelligence, and prisons, a faction of the war veterans, and militia groups such as Chipangano, which the party uses to attack and intimidate civil society and opposition party activists (Mutongwizo 2014). At the non-elite level, the regime has an extensive patronage network, which consists of the leaders mentioned above, their family members and acquaintances, supporters of the party, and businesspeople who act as both financiers of the party, and beneficiaries of its patronage through access to tenders and other lucrative business opportunities accessed through state entities.4\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"Fn5\"], \"section\": \"ZANU PF\\u2019s leadership and intertwined political and economic interests\", \"text\": \"Thus, Mnangagwa, Chiwenga, and the rest of the ZANU PF top brass and members of the patronage cartel have a vested interest in maintaining hegemonic control over the country\\u2019s political system for political and economic reasons. The government is, in effect, the ZANU PF\\u2019s cartel\\u2019s means of access to material benefits and livelihoods. Several corruption scandals have revealed the deep web of linkages between top government officials and local and international beneficiaries.5 ZANU PF functionaries at various levels of the organization\\u2019s hierarchy depend on their political offices and the party\\u2019s hold over power for their livelihood. This was demonstrated by the degree to which several former leaders, expelled from the government after the November 2017 coup, fell on hard times soon after. Thus, the line between government business and private interests is blurred because of state capture and politics of patronage. Civil society organizations\\u2019 activities are, therefore, a threat to these intertwined objectives of the ZANU PF cartel: control of the state and access to economic benefits.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR38\", \"CR38\", \"CR6\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"An analysis of the ruling of the ZANU PF regime\\u2019s primary sources of power demonstrates its inability to accommodate a vibrant and unconstrained civil society sector. Masunungure and Bratton (2011) show that the country\\u2019s military and security agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), underwrite the regime\\u2019s power and extended stay in office (Masunungure 2011; Bratton 2014). Security agents maintain the status quo through direct attacks, threats, or violence against the political opposition and civil society activists who speak out against the government or challenge its power in any manner the regime deems threatening.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR35\", \"CR47\", \"Fn6\", \"CR54\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"Secondly, the ZANU PF regime exploits state institutions, resulting in the conflation of ZANU PF as a party and the government of Zimbabwe. Government institutions have, since independence, operated in service of ZANU PF\\u2019s interests instead of being impartial distributors of public goods, mainly through sources of patronage and as tools for attacking political opponents. For instance, the party abuses state resources, such as public funds, vehicles, fuel, and state-owned media, mainly the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), to run its political campaigns (Magaisa 2019; Ndakaripa 2020). It has a well-documented, profoundly entrenched culture of patronage and cronyism that includes irregularly awarding tenders to government officials and their cronies and outright theft of public funds through various strategies. Examples of large-scale corruption include the Willowvale car procurement scandal in 19886 and, more recently, multiple corruption and fraud cases involving President Emmerson Mnangagwa\\u2019s close associate, Kudakwashe Tagwirei, and Vice President Constantino Chiwenga (Sharife and Anderson 2021).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR35\", \"CR59\", \"CR51\", \"CR22\", \"CR43\", \"CR36\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"Besides using the government as a cash cow, ZANU PF instrumentalizes the judiciary to attack political opponents (Magaisa 2019). The party has a well-documented record of employing intelligence agents and police officers to abduct and detain civil society and opposition activists for extended periods without trial (US Embassy in Zimbabwe 2017). Civil society activists and opposition leaders have been arraigned before the courts on trumped-up charges and subjected to lengthy, costly, and humiliating judicial processes (HRW Report 2008; FH Report: Zimbabwe 2021). Since 2018, ZANU PF has intensified its attacks on opposition activists from the leading opposition Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) and numerous independent journalists(Muronzi 2022. Those who have suffered state brutality include a member of parliament who has been repeatedly denied bail and remains in prison after more than 200\\u00a0days as of January 2023. Others include party spokesperson Fadzayi Mahere who is frequently called to court over frivolous charges. Activists from Matabeleland spent a night in jail after attending the Gukurahundi commemoration in December 2022, and have been repeatedly arrested and imprisoned for extended periods as part of the ZANU PF regime\\u2019s tactics to intimidate the leaders, their supporters, and allies). The regime employs \\u201crule by law,\\u201d or judicial purposes, as a tool of political persecution to wear out opponents and instill fear in would-be critics. By and large, Zimbabwe\\u2019s judiciary is biased, and most rulings, especially in politically sensitive cases, go the way of the party (Magaisa 2020).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR13\", \"CR55\", \"CR49\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"The ZANU PF regime\\u2019s third power source is ideological: the party\\u2019s revolutionary narrative and propaganda. ZANU PF, like South Africa\\u2019s African National Congress (ANC) and Namibia\\u2019s South West African People\\u2019s Organization (SWAPO), continually portrays its leaders as heroes of the anti-colonial, revolutionary activism and armed campaigns that delivered the country\\u2019s independence from colonial rule (Clapham 2012; Southall 2013). This message resonates with the party\\u2019s supporters, particularly those in rural areas. In this vein, the party deploys this \\u2018liberation ideology\\u2019 that any kind of opposition political organization and civil society activism against ZANU PF is \\u2018unpatriotic\\u2019 and a threat to the country\\u2019s independence\\u2014thus conflating its definition of patriotism with zealous support for ZANU PF (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011). As a result, opponents of the ruling party, both in the country\\u2019s opposition parties and critics in the civil society, are branded as \\u2018sellouts\\u2019 who endeavor to deliver the country back to the clutches of British colonialism and neo-imperial domination by other European countries and the USA.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR19\", \"CR29\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"The preceding analysis of Zimbabwe's political system provides an important background to the country\\u2019s civil society\\u2019s complicated relationship with the state in the post-independence era. While the government has openly received aid via NGO channels, CSOs have also been consistently met with suspicion and accused of being western-funded to destabilize the government (Dorman 2003; Kandemiiri 2013). ZANU PF has always been quick to silence civil society organizations that engaged in human rights-related work or criticized the government for human rights abuses, both by omission and commission. For example, during Mugabe\\u2019s time, Dr. Mashiri (not her real name) worked with a women\\u2019s trust organization in the early 2000s. She recalled heightened scrutiny on their work after the 2000 election, which saw ZANU PF losing its senate majority for the first time. Their organization has always been a trusted agency for advocating for victims of domestic violence and those living with HIV. Still, the government was suddenly concerned that their advocacy had become too political. Indeed, by 2004 ZANU PF minister of Public Service and Social Welfare, Paul Mangwana, was actively campaigning against civil society groups. In 2004, he was quoted saying the following about CSOSs:\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"Fn7\"], \"section\": \"\", \"text\": \"Some NGOs and churches are causing too much confusion in the country because they are converting their humanitarian programs into politics \\u2026 The government cannot allow that to happen, so we are saying they should go under scrutiny where we revise all modalities of their operations in the country.7\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR14\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"During Mr. Mangwana\\u2019s tenure, the government introduced the first bill geared toward giving the government more control over the work of NGOs and churches. A reverend affiliated with the Methodist church interviewed under anonymity for this paper recalls that starting in 2004, churches were asked to provide details about their membership. The government was concerned that churches were working with western journalists or harboring opposition activists on the run. By November 2004, the government had suspended the constitution to fast-track the NGO bill. Precedence for restrictive laws that prevented citizens from agitating for their rights had been set two years prior with the passing of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). These two legislative acts directly targeted media groups (Crisis Coalition 2004). The situation progressively worsened through the remainder of Mugabe\\u2019s term. However, CSOs remained resolute, and there was much active work on human rights and exposing government malpractice in various areas.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR9\", \"CR9\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"However, in June 2021, the government threatened NGOs through rhetoric and legislation. Government spokesperson George Charamba said, \\u201cWe cannot allow, internally, any organization which we register under our statutes to subvert the sovereignty and integrity of Zimbabwe\\u201d (Chidakwa 2021). In the same statement, the government repeated its narrative that many NGOs are working under a sole mandate for regime change and that \\u201cvery few of them are helping to build schools, clinics, to give livelihoods to our people through irrigation schemes. All of them are employed to achieve regime change in Zimbabwe. We condemn it as they are calculated to undermine the orderly evolution of our political, economic, and judicial systems and must be condemned\\u201d (Chidakwa 2021).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR23\", \"CR11\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"Mnangagwa\\u2019s government also introduced restrictive laws to curtail civic space, a tactic frequently used during Mugabe\\u2019s tenure of office. The Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) Amendment Bill to restrict civil society space, introduced in 2021, is a case in point. According to the government, the Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Bill 2021 is being proposed \\u201cto comply with the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) recommendations to Zimbabwe. Further, it has become necessary to streamline administrative procedures for private voluntary organizations to allow for efficient regulation and registration.\\u201d (GOV OF ZIMBABWE 2021). The government also claims that the bill will assist in preventing money laundering and bringing the country into compliance with international law. The bill is an amendment to the very restrictive Private Voluntary Acts (1996, 2002), and the proposed changes will give the executive more power to closely monitor civil society's activities and constant evaluation that their mission is complementary to that of the ruling party (Chifamba 2021b).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR46\", \"CR42\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"Another draconian strategy to stifle civil society activity through monitoring and surveillance is President Mnangagwa\\u2019s creation of a new and largely unconstitutional role of ten Provincial Development Coordinators in August 2020 (Ncube 2020). Their job was described as assisting the Ministry of Local Affairs, another controversial ministry, with technical and administrative support. Efforts to lobby against the creation of this office by citizens and civil society failed. By December 2021, Mnangagwa announced that the Provincial Development Coordinators would be promoted and given even more powers that potentially curtail civil society activities. In June 2021, the Provincial Development Coordinator (PDC) of Harare, Tafadzwa Muguti, stated that all NGOs operating in the capital city, Harare, would now need to seek permission to use through his office beginning July 2021. Consistent with the new regime rhetoric, in his public address, Mr. Muguti emphasized that civil society and business entities seeking to work in Zimbabwe would be watched closely: \\u201cThe first task is unbundling ministry duties to the province. I will be meeting captains of the industry to hear what they will be able to contribute to our provincial economic plan. Everything we do as Harare is under the spotlight. Anyone who flies into Zimbabwe meets us first.\\u201d (Munhende 2021).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR34\", \"CR28\"], \"section\": \"Sources of power: state security apparatus, public institutions, and revolutionary propaganda\", \"text\": \"This policy has no constitutional mandate, which violates freedom of speech and expression. The goal of these mandates is twofold, first, to criminalize the work of civil society organizations and, secondly, to trap them in a never-ending cycle of government red tape. The constant changes in government personnel due to intra-party fighting further complicates the civil society groups' ability to adhere to the regulations. The anticipated chaos started shortly after the announcement. In late July 2021, there was an attempt to ban all non-compliant organizations, which failed to take effect after civil society organizations filed a successful petition with the courts (Mabika 2021). Government officials had announced that out of the over 3000 CSOs working in Zimbabwe, only 40 were compliant. Ironically, their ban extended to the first lady\\u2019s controversial charity organization, Angel of Hope Foundation, partly explaining why the courts dismissed the ban announcement. Nevertheless, as expected, all other NGOs had spent their limited resources fighting another court battle they did not need to engage in (Human Rights Forum 2021). Mugabe\\u2019s government routinely used the same tools of repression against civil society, and now Mnangagwa is further refining the strategies.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR64\"], \"section\": \"Developmental authoritarianism and Interest Groups in the post-Mugabe-era\", \"text\": \"Besides using the law to undermine civil society activity, Mnangagwa\\u2019s government has also employed co-option as part of his regime\\u2019s carrot-and-stick strategy. This strategy aims to diffuse the power of non-aligned interest groups and persons and centralize control within the state. To this end, the government has created interest groups like the Presidential Advisory Council, a 26-member Presidential Advisory Council (PAC) in 2019 consisting of eminent figures and experts from business, health, agriculture, civil society, faith-based organizations, and education a few months after the 2018 elections (The Herald Zimbabwe 2019). Mnangagwa indicated that the purpose for establishing the PAC was to receive expert and unbiased input in policy formulation, especially the government\\u2019s Vision 2030 agenda, from a group of knowledgeable and unbiased citizens (Staff Reporter_Zimbabwe Mail 2019). The council\\u2019s membership included formerly fierce opponents of ZANU PF in civil society and churches. This was consistent with Mnangagwa\\u2019s strategy to bring critics under his wing. As expected, public response was mixed; others criticized the bloated nature of the council and the costs involved, while others also lauded the president for a diverse and inclusive team of advisors.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR2\"], \"section\": \"Developmental authoritarianism and Interest Groups in the post-Mugabe-era\", \"text\": \"Although the PAC is not the traditional type of interest group, its membership includes NGOs and civil society, so it is worth a brief discussion. For example, Kenneth Mtata, secretary of the Zimbabwe Council for Churches, has traditionally spoken out against ZANU PF. It is not surprising then that since the last election, church leaders have been more open in their support for the president and even, at one point, called for a suspension of elections, arguing that the nation needed an extended period of healing from politics (Anli 2019). In a country where over 90% of voters report a Christian affiliation, the church\\u2019s backdoor endorsement of ZANU PF is impactful. The formal church formations were also important allies for pro-democracy groups during the Mugabe era. However, they, too, have moved toward supporting the Mnangagwa regime. In interviews with various bishops, they indicated that their support for the new president was anchored in the optimistic belief that he would live up to his promises. Mnangagwa has also been successful at pitting younger church leaders who fit the bill of social media influencers who have millions of followers on social media against more older church leaders who are not easily bought off. Church leaders willing to work with the president have been rewarded with high-level ambassadorial posts. The goal of doing this is to cause fissures within various civil society structures.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR39\", \"CR8\"], \"section\": \"Developmental authoritarianism and Interest Groups in the post-Mugabe-era\", \"text\": \"In addition to targeting religious organizations, the Mnangagwa regime has also gone after the media. Early PAC members included media mogul Trevor Ncube who was forced into exile for over two decades during the Mugabe years for exposing state brutality. By including Mr. Ncube, Mnangagwa was signaling that he would work with independent media, an area previously closed off to ZANU PF. Mr. Ncube\\u2019s newspaper, The Independent, was among a dozen private media houses subjected to state-sponsored attacks, which included bombings since the early 2000s (Meldrum 2001). That Mr. Ncube accepted work with Mnangagwa sent a strong signal that he believed free and independent media had a chance under Mnangagwa. However, the militarized government of Mnangagwa cannot function alongside institutions of democracy. Although Mr. Ncube has yet to speak publicly about his experience within the PAC, he has indicated that he officially resigned from the organization, citing disagreements on democratic norms with the president (Chibamu 2022). Subsequently, the independent media has been left in chaos. Independent journalists continue to be harassed and jailed without course. The weakening of various interest groups strengthens the regime's strategies.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR62\", \"CR25\", \"CR52\"], \"section\": \"Developmental authoritarianism and Interest Groups in the post-Mugabe-era\", \"text\": \"Mnangagwa\\u2019s government has also committed to changing the perceptions about ZANU PF's relationship with the business world and appointed several business executives to the PAC. This includes Natalie Jabangwe, EcoCash's partner company of ECONET, the largest company in Zimbabwe. This appointment was also critical because the founder and owner of ECONET, Mr. Strive Masiyiwa, has been in exile since 1999 following many attempts on his life by the government. This appointment signaled that Mnangagwa was extending an olive branch to many in the business world who felt unsafe under Mugabe. The strategy worked, at least for a little while. Although Masiyiwa did not physically return home, he used his public voice on social media to shore up support for Mnangagwa and provided much-needed financial support (Staff Writer, 2018). There was also a rush to return home by other business exiles such as Mutumwa Mawere (Guma 2010) and another media mogul, James Makamba (Staff Reporter 2017).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR27\", \"CR10\"], \"section\": \"Developmental authoritarianism and Interest Groups in the post-Mugabe-era\", \"text\": \"In addition to forming the PAC and as part of his co-option strategy toward critics, Mnangagwa used his executive powers to make the Political Actors Dialogue (POLAD), a coalition of 2018 election losers minus Nelson Chamisa, leader of the Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), the country\\u2019s largest opposition political party, and himself (Helliker and Chikozho Mazarire 2021). As with the PAC, POLAD brings together some of ZANU PF\\u2019s most vocal opponents, including Thokozani Khupe, Douglas Mwonzora, and Lovemore Madhuku. POLAD has justified its participation by arguing that this organization is part of a thriving civil society that sees political parties of different frameworks working together (Chifamba 2021a). Political parties merit mention here because they are essential to the civil society community. They serve to advocate for the issues most important to their constituencies. Between 1980 and 1999, Zimbabwe functioned as a de facto one-party state with very little opposition. The rise of the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 marked a shift in Zimbabwe\\u2019s democratic journey. For the last two decades, the MDC has enrichened political discourse and curtailed some of ZANU PFs worst tendencies. Mnangagwa\\u2019s regime is interested in closing this political space and creating a de facto one-party state.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR10\"], \"section\": \"Developmental authoritarianism and Interest Groups in the post-Mugabe-era\", \"text\": \"In his words, Mr. Madhuku member of POLAD said, \\u201cPOLAD is a useful platform that can be a way forward for Zimbabwe because it allows [political] losers to work with winners, and this must be adopted across African countries such as Zambia and Botswana. As NCA, we believe that it is an important way of governing the affairs of society, and voters need to know that governance is not only for those who won an election, but [also for] those that have lost so that the nation progresses by working together.\\u201d (Chifamba 2021a). Political analysts, including Alex Magaisa, Phelan Zamchiya, and Brian Raftopolous, interviewed for this paper, argue that POLAD is just another attempt to sow further division in the opposition and buy loyalty. Members of both POLAD and the PAC have been given a lot of perks, including luxury vehicles. In a\\u00a0country where the economy is failing, it is tough for individuals to walk away from such benefits. As a result, the country\\u2019s political opposition is more divided than it has ever been. Under such circumstances, it is easy for the ruling party to pit individuals against each other and bait weaker members with financial incentives. A weakened opposition has also made it harder for other civil society organizations to rally under a special message.\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR57\", \"CR37\"], \"section\": \"Impact of ZANU PF\\u2019s authoritarianism on the civil society sector\", \"text\": \"Although most CSOs remain opposed to government interference, unlike in the Mugabe era, there appears to be a more significant schism in how CSOs respond to government restrictions. In an interview with the founder and leader of an organization that works on women\\u2019s and children\\u2019s rights, they said they had no issue with these new directives. They argued that their organization was compliant and that others should follow the law. When asked why they did not see these measures as problematic when they had previously lobbied against similar efforts during the Mugabe era, they shrugged and said, \\u201cthings are different now. Mugabe is gone. We must rebuild the country\\u201d (Tariro, name changed, 2021). This is a common refrain from former opposition and civil society leaders who have opted to work with Mnangagwa. Another interviewee who worked for an organization dedicated to promoting voter participation shared the same sentiments adding that \\u201cwe have to stop talking bad about our country.\\u201d (MARY, name changed, 2021).\"}, {\"pmc\": \"PMC10033284\", \"pmid\": \"\", \"reference_ids\": [\"CR57\"], \"section\": \"Impact of ZANU PF\\u2019s authoritarianism on the civil society sector\", \"text\": \"One might say that there is some creeping fatigue with fighting losing battles against a government that will not likely lose power. For those who do not see a post-ZANU PF era anytime soon, it is much easier to cut their losses and work within the framework of the government. The same leader from the children and women\\u2019s organization also added that \\u201cnot everything has to be political. I choose to focus on educating every child regardless of the party affiliation of their parents\\u201d (Tariro, name changed, 2021). The government has praised their organization as an example of good citizenship. It is too early to know if these organizations and individuals willing to tow the party line will continue to do so and if the government will treat them positively. It is also telling that although both Mary and Tariro had positive things to say about their experience working under the Mnangagwa regimes, they feared having their actual identities associated with their comments.\"}]"
Metadata
"{\"issue-copyright-statement\": \"\\u00a9 Springer Nature Limited 2023\"}"